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Abstract 
Detecting unknown threats is a paradox; how do you detect a threat if it is not known 
to exist? The answer is that unknown threat detection is the process of making a 
previously unknown threat identifiable in the shortest possible time frame. This 
thesis examines the possibility of creating an unknown threat detection mechanism 
that security experts can use for developing a flexible protection system for 
networks. A system that allows the detection of unknown threats through distributed 
host based monitoring and the incorporation of dynamic and flexible logics with 
situational knowledge is described as well as the mechanisms used to develop such a 
system is illustrated. The system not only allows the detection of new threats but 
does so in a fast and efficient manner to increase the available time for responding to 
these threats.
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1 Introduction  
The digital age has revolutionised the way we do business, gather information, and 
communicate. People can instantly communicate with friends and relatives around 
the world through instant messaging and e-mail applications while checking the 
latest stock prices. The massive interconnection that is the Internet encourages the 
fast dissemination of information and data which is vital for research and knowledge 
expansion. The explosive growth of the Internet, however, has come at a cost; people 
with malicious intentions now have a window into every computer and viruses 
plague corporations and home users alike. The number of threats that Internet users 
face is growing exponentially due mainly to the anonymity of the Internet and ease 
of malicious code mutations and distribution. The safeguards that we use to counter 
these threats do well to stop a number of the threats however the process by which 
they operate have a major flaw; they can only protect against threats that are known. 
These threats have been previously unleashed upon an unsuspecting network of 
systems and caused destruction and havoc. After the carnage is finished the makers 
of threat defences determine how to protect systems against the threat and release 
updates and patches for their software. This situation forms a veritable arms race that 
is always in the favour of threat creators due to the reactive nature of the security 
mechanisms. To keep ahead of the competition the threat creators are always 
developing new techniques by which to unleash debilitating attacks. To compound 
the problem the threats are ever changing, deviating from the original form so as to 
avoid detection by the security systems. To shift the balance back in the favour of the 
defenders what is needed is a way of detecting and stopping any threat; whether it be 
known from previous experience or not. The main focus at the current point in time 
is the unknown threats as these have yet to be seen and will cause significant 
damage.  
Unknown threat detection has become a highly investigated area of the Internet 
security community. Unknown threat detection is the process of identifying a 
previously unknown attack by finding the factors that will make it identifiable for 
every occasion it appears. This process seems paradoxical; how can unknown threats 
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be identified if they are unknown? How can these unknown threats be detected if 
they are not known to exist? The answers to these questions are both negative and 
positive. If an unknown threat is created perfectly then it can spread without 
detection until it is time to strike. However, just as flawless software cannot be 
created; there is no perfect unknown threat. The unknown threat will have some 
weakness within its operation that will indicate that something suspicious is 
occurring. The activities of the threat appear, analogous to a human illness, as 
symptoms on the host machine. After careful examination these symptoms will 
identify the existence of a problem and hence the unknown threat. 
An example of the unknown threat detection process in action is the investigations 
during and after the attack of the first Internet worm. 
On the evening of 2nd of November, 1988 the Internet came under attack from a 
mysterious new threat (Spafford 1991, p. 1). Machines at the Cornell University and 
MIT were exhibiting strange. Symptoms of a new type of attack began to emerge; 
machines would get loaded with running processes until they would crash. During 
these initial stages there was a fear that “…the program was somehow tampering 
with system resources in a way that could not be readily detected—that while a cure 
was being sought, system files were being altered or information destroyed.” 
(Spafford 1991, p. 1) After three days of damage limitation the threat was identified 
as what is now known as the Morris worm, and corrective measures were 
successfully created. After the infection dissipated a conference to classify the threat 
and after much debate the term ‘Worm’ spawned into existence within computing 
circles.  
The Morris worm illustrated to the security personnel of the time the importance of 
the ability to detect new unknown threats before they can cause significant damage. 
The focuses of this work turned towards expecting new threats and creating 
mechanisms to better lockdown and protect hosts. It soon became apparent to the 
computer security field that it would be impossible to conceive what every new 
threat would be; there are just too many possible avenues of attack. After much 
research it was determined that the key for successful protection against an unknown 
threat is through reduction of the time it takes for the identification and response to 
an unknown threat after manifestation.  
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The research of thesis focuses on reducing response times and decreasing the time it 
takes to classify an unknown attack. In addition to the decreasing identification time, 
the unknown threat detection system will ensure that while it identifies unknown 
threats, normal conditions are not identified as threats (a false positive) and that a 
threat is not classified as normal traffic (a false negative).  
This thesis will investigate the background and issues that are relevant to the network 
security domain as well as the techniques proposed in the development of a 
distributed monitoring system. Then the aims of the research system are described 
with reference to the background and the issues pertaining to the domain. Following 
this the methods used to implement and test the research system will be explored 
along with the analysis and discussion of the results produced. Finally conclusions 
will be drawn along with the proposition of possible future extensions to the research 
system.
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2 Background 
2.1 Networks 
A network is a series of devices that interact through a common communication 
scheme. The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) is standard reference model used 
to describe the processes involved in the communication between two nodes in a 
network (Mueller 2002). This reference model breaks the functions of network 
communication into seven, self-contained, abstract layers. Each layer in the OSI 
reference model relies on the functions and services provided by the layer/s below it. 
Application Layer (7) 
Presentation Layer (6) 
Session Layer (5) 
Transport Layer (4) 
Network Layer (3) 
Data-Link Layer (2) 
Physical Layer (1) 
                     Figure 2-1: The OSI Reference Model (Mueller 2002)       
2.1.1 Data Communication 
In order for data to be transmitted on a network it must use an encapsulation process. 
Firstly data is broken up into small pieces called datagrams. Then it is passed through 
the equivalent OSI reference model layers, with a number of layers adding headers 
that contain useful processing information. When the process is complete the final 
encapsulated data, called a packet, has all of the necessary information for 
transmission over networks. 
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Figure 2-2: The Data Encapsulation Process (Computer Technology Documents) 
2.1.2 Connection-Oriented and Connection-Less 
Communication between two hosts on a network occurs in two modes; with 
established connections and without. In connection-less communication the source 
host just addresses the packet to the intended recipient without prior notification. 
When the packet arrives at the destination the recipient host understands, through 
protocol identification, that no logical connection is required and processes the 
packet immediately. An example of a protocol that uses connection-less operation is 
user datagram protocol (UDP). In connection-oriented communication the source 
host must first establish a logical connection, or session, with the destination host 
before transmission of data occurs. The source host and the destination host undergo 
a handshaking procedure after which, if successful, a session is established and data 
transmission proceeds. A protocol that uses connection-oriented communication is 
the transport control protocol (TCP). Figure 2-3 shows the handshake procedure 
defined for TCP. 
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      Figure 2-3: Three-Way Handshake Process (Schuba et al. 1997) 
 
2.2  Network Security 
2.2.1 What is Network Security? 
Security, in a general context, is defined as “…a state of freedom from danger or 
risk” (Ciampa 2005). When applied to networks, security becomes the ability for 
data transmission and access to system resources free from danger or risk. The 
resources requiring protection within a network are dubbed its assets; this includes 
resources such as a printers, computers, or data. The properties of the assets that need 
protection are the confidentiality, the integrity and the availability of the assets 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger 2003). 
The confidentiality of the information is the assurance that the information will only 
be obtainable by parties deemed authorised to access it. This ensures that information 
will not be disclosed to people who have no rights to access it. An example of 
confidentiality protection would be to ensure that competing companies does not get 
access to an organisation’s research plans. The term access covers not only viewing 
the material, but printing, copying, or even the knowledge of the existence of the 
protected material. 
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The integrity of an asset is the assurance that the asset has only been modified by 
people authorised to do so. In this context, the term modification refers to the 
writing, changing, altering status, deleting and creation of false information. 
The availability of an asset is the timely access by authorised parties to the asset. If a 
legitimate party attempts to access an asset then that party should have access as 
soon as physically possible. If an authorised person is denied access to certain time-
critical information for a certain period of time then it can affect the usefulness of the 
information. An example of time-critical information is the current stock prices. 
If the network assets have these three critical properties protected then it can be 
deemed secure. However security is not the assurance that all attacks on assets will 
be prevented rather it is a defence that attempts to ward off attacks and prevent the 
collapse of a system in the event of an attack (Ciampa 2005). 
2.2.2 What makes attacks possible? 
Network and Internet, attacks are successful because of software bugs (errors) and 
vulnerabilities that exist within the various applications and protocols in use on the 
network. Each attack will exploit one or more known vulnerabilities in order achieve 
its malicious goal. The solution to this problem seems obvious; create software that 
has no software bugs or vulnerabilities. Many companies have tried to create bug 
free software through expensive testing and software validation procedures however 
this has proven to be impossible. As Schneier (Schneier 2004) states “Squashing 
software bugs that affect performance is hard; finding software flaws that affect 
security is even harder.” (Schneier 2004, p. 204) 
There are a number of examples over the years of multi-million dollar software 
developments failing catastrophically due to software failures. The following is just 
one of the many software error induced disasters. 
On June 4, 1996 the unmanned rocket named Ariane 5 exploded forty seconds after 
lift-off. The rocket was developed over a decade by the European Space Agency at a 
cost of $7 billion. The resulting enquiry into the disaster found that the cause of the 
explosion was due to a software error. During lift-off a 64 bit floating point number 
Distributed Security Monitoring for Unknown Threats Background  
 - 8 -  
was converted to a 16 bit signed integer. A number, that was larger than the largest 
possible integer, failed in the conversion process which resulted in the rocket veering 
off course and exploding (Arnold 2000). If the European Space Agency, even after 
so much funding and development time, still has software bugs at launch time then 
how is a normal organisation with a restricted software development budget 
supposed to create error free software? 
The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) has compiled statistics on 
vulnerabilities discovered from various organisations that report to it. Figure 2-4 
shows the reported vulnerabilities over the previous decade. The figures displayed 
are best case due to the fact that not all companies report vulnerabilities to 
CERT/CC. The reason that many companies do not wish to report and publish all of 
the  vulnerabilities of their systems as it may impact on consumer confidence and 
hence profit margins. 
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Figure 2-4: CERT/CC Reported Vulnerabilities (CERT Coordination Center 2005) 
Figure 2-4 shows that the number of software vulnerabilities has been steadily 
increasing over the last decade. This is due to software and protocols becoming more 
complex; adding support for more new features and functionality as well as 
interactions with increasingly complex data structures. When vulnerability is 
discovered it is normal practice for the responsible company to produce a correcting 
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patch. The patch will fix the reported problem however it is possible that this patch 
may fix the original security hole while creating a new one. 
Malicious people create attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities to penetrate 
unprotected hosts. CERT/CC has been keeping track of the number of security 
incidents reported to them by various corporations. Figure 2-5 shows the increasing 
trend in the number of incidents reported over a period of sixteen years. 
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Figure 2-5: Reported Incidents (CERT Coordination Center 2005) 
As can be seen there is a direct relationship between the increasing number of 
reported vulnerabilities and the number of reported security incidents. Other factors 
that increase the amount of security incidents are anonymity, ease of malicious code 
distribution through the Internet and ease of threat mutation. 
 
2.3 The Threats 
The term threat has a number of interpretations depending upon the context in which 
it is used. In computing the term threat is defined as any action, malicious or 
otherwise, which can have an undesirable effect on the assets and resources within a 
computer system (Amoroso 1994). There are many different types of threat that exist 
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within the computing field; the following sections will broadly investigate a subset of 
the computing threat matrix. 
2.3.1 General Intrusion 
An intrusion is where an unauthorised person/s attempts to gain access to system 
resources that they are not permitted to access. Typically this threat occurs from 
outside of the network and uses the organisations outside connection/s as the means 
of entry. The other form of this threat, which has been steadily increasing, is the 
internal intrusion. Internal intrusion occurs when disgruntled or curious employees 
attempt to cause damage by using their legitimate network access. The disgruntled 
employee wishes to disrupt the normal operations of the organisation while the 
curious employee wishes to investigate the possibility of disruption. Internal 
intrusions are typically successful as the employee will be trusted within the network. 
The intruder, whether internal or external, has many possible tools in his/her arsenal 
to achieve maximum possibility of success. One of the simplest, and typically the 
most effective tools is the use of social engineering (Dolan 2004). This is where the 
attacker uses social skills in order to elicit information from a person for the purposes 
of compromising organisational assets. The attacker can call the helpdesk posing as a 
legitimate employee who has lost their password. The unsuspecting support staff 
member will divulge the information to the attacker assuming him/her to be 
legitimate. Another example of the successfulness of this technique is when an 
attacker poses as maintenance personnel in order to gain insider access. Typically no-
one will challenge an appropriately dressed cleaning staff. With this inside access the 
would-be cleaner can then gain access to the machines through lax security such as 
username/password combinations written on sticky notes attached to monitors. 
In addition to the elegant and simple process of social engineering the intruder can 
use many other techniques including brute forcing passwords, stack smashing, and 
using protocol and software vulnerabilities to name a few. The main principle of this 
threat is to gain access to the network assets using any means possible and from there 
achieving some set malicious goal. 
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2.3.2 Denial of Service 
The way in which the class of Denial of Service (DoS) threats operate are through 
the abuse of a particular service in order to disrupt or prevent normal system 
operation (Cheswick, Bellovin & Rubin 2003). The abuse of the service involves 
extreme overuse of a service in an attempt to strain software, hardware or network 
links to beyond intended capacity. DoS attacks have the effect of degrading the 
quality of service that a system or network link can provide to a point where it can no 
longer function. SYN flooding is an example of a specific DoS attack designed to 
attack Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networks (Schuba 
et al. 1997).  It operates by sending a flood of TCP connection requests to the victim 
machine from a number of different impersonated (spoofed) addresses. The victim 
machine will then reserve system resources for each connection request until it runs 
out of resources. Thus denying any further connection requests from legitimate hosts. 
A recent mutation of the DoS threat is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack whereby a number of zombies (attacker conscripted hosts) all DoS attack at 
once. 
A well orchestrated DoS attack, such as the DDoS attack, can bring a target 
organisation network to its knees. The risks from this threat are very real as there are 
numerous variants of this type of threat and very little that can be done to stop them. 
As Cheswick (Cheswick, Bellovin & Rubin 2003) states “Any public service can be 
abused by the public.” (Cheswick, Bellovin & Rubin 2003, p. 111) 
2.3.3 Viruses 
A virus is a program that passes on malicious code to other programs by modifying 
them and attaching themselves to the host program. The term ‘virus’ came from the 
malicious programs behaving similarly to biological viruses: it infects other systems 
by attaching itself to a host program and incapacitating it or coexisting with it 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger 2003). In order to be highly successful at propagation the virus 
needs to spread before destroying an infected host, otherwise this instance of the 
virus dies with the host; thus reducing the chances of mass infection. The first ever 
computer virus strain, Brain, appeared in the middle of the 1980s (Peyton 2003). 
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These original viruses were more mischievous rather than malicious; they would play 
sounds or create pop-up windows. From these rather innocent beginnings the 
computer virus has evolved to become, in terms of damage and likelihood of attack, 
one of the most significant threats that exist to computers to date.  
The major factor that makes viruses so virulent, just like the biological counterpart, is 
the ability of the virus to mutate. When it is first unleashed a virus will have certain 
characteristics and traits that will enable anti-virus detection and subsequent 
inoculation. However at any point during its lifetime the virus can mutate and exhibit 
new characteristics that will appear to an anti-virus system as a completely new 
unknown virus (if it is able to detect the mutated threat at all). 
Dangerous as they are viruses tend to propagate slowly due to their reliance on 
human interaction. Users unwittingly spread viruses by running or copying infected 
files to the computer. A number of viruses use e-mail as a propagation method due to 
the significant user base of e-mail. An infected program is attached to an innocently 
titled e-mail and sent to numerous unsuspecting recipients. The recipients of the 
‘infected’ e-mail are tricked into accessing the attachment; the computer becomes 
infected with the virus and the cycle perpetuates. However there is a new class of 
viruses called Worms that have the ability for mass infection through self 
propagation.  
2.3.4 Worms 
A Worm is a newer type of virus that spreads utilising its own means. That is, unlike 
a normal virus, a Worm requires no human intervention in order to propagate. This 
distinction between viruses and Worms is not sharp as there is a class of Worms 
called stealth or contagion Worms that hide signs of infection in otherwise innocuous 
user activity (Staniford, Paxson & Weaver 2002).  
To achieve propagation a Worm must discover new active hosts to infect. A Worm 
can discover new victims through a variety of mechanisms (Weaver et al. 2003). The 
author of the Worm can create a pre-generated list of target hosts which he/she has 
identified in advance. Host discovery can also occur through the Worm extracting 
lists of hosts from a matchmaking service’s (such as the Gamespy service) 
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metaserver. This metaserver contains a list of hosts and servers that are currently 
active. The active host lists significant aid the Worm in its propagation efforts. 
Another host discovery mechanism the Worm can use is a topological search of the 
current victim machine for local information. The Worm can examine the machine 
for local topology information that is contained in protocols, such as Network 
Yellow pages, and files, such as the hosts contained within /etc/hosts (Linux 
operating system file). This type of examination is quick and effective as these active 
hosts are directly accessible through the local network medium. The last method that 
a Worm seeking active host can use is through scanning. Scanning is where the 
Worm probes a set of address, sequentially or random, to identify active hosts. Due 
to the simplicity and effectiveness of such a strategy a number of Worms use this 
technique for active host discovery. Once an active host is discovered the Worm 
identifies the open ports on this host. The Worm will then mobilise and infect this 
system by using any of the software vulnerabilities contained on the victim machine. 
From there the entire process repeats until the Worm is finally discovered and 
neutralised.  
The damage that a Worm can cause through automated self-propagation is 
significant. On July 19th, 2001 the Code Red Worm (version 2) began its vicious 
debut on the Internet. It was designed to scan for and infect active hosts until 00:00 
UTC on July 20th, 2001. In just one day of infection the success rate of this Worm 
was incredible. Figure 2-6 shows just how effective Code Red’s infection rate was. 
 
Figure 2-6: Code Red V2 Worm Infection Rate (Zou, Gong & Towsley 2002) 
Other significant Worm infections have followed Code Red’s success such as the 
SQL Slammer Worm which infected 90% of all vulnerable machines on the Internet 
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in ten minutes (Moore et al. 2003). The rate of infection was so fast that human 
intervention to stop it was impossible. Due to an implementation error the payload of 
this Worm was benign; however the number of scans that the infected hosts created 
was enough to disrupt functioning of the entire Internet. If the payload of this Worm 
was malicious what would the Internet landscape be like today? 
From the observations of just two of the many Worm variants it can be seen that the 
risks associated with type of threat are significant. If there was a way to detect and 
stop any unknown Worm at the first few infected host the dangers would be greatly 
minimised. 
 
2.4  The Threat Counter Measures 
A number of different types of security mechanisms have been created to counter the 
numerous threats that users are exposed to when communicating with the ‘outside’ 
world. Each of these mechanisms varies in terms of protection strength, ease of 
implementation, maintenance and complexity however each the goal of providing a 
measure of computer security. The security mechanisms are most effective when 
deployed together, working in unison in an attempt to provide an all encompassing 
blanket of security. This ‘defence in depth’ provides better security because there are 
no single points of failure. If one system fails then the network’s defence falls to the 
next protection mechanism that has been deployed.  
Another consideration required when deploying threat counter measures is the 
deployment strategy used. There are two strategies used when deploying the security 
structures are perimeter security and host based security. 
2.4.1  Perimeter Based Security 
In perimeter based security the strategy is to defend the entire network by protecting 
the access to the network through guarding the main entrance from the ‘outside’. The 
definition of the outside is any external network connected to the network that is not 
under administrative control of the organisation. This definition of ‘outside’ covers 
other organisational network connections, say to partner companies, and the Internet 
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connection/s. In this protection scheme the main focus is to strengthen the walls and 
the doorway to the organisation’s network. The principle is that if the perimeter is 
tightly secured and regulated then any attempted outside access will be screened and 
only legitimate connections will be made. Figure 2-7 demonstrates this principle. 
 
 
Figure 2-7: A Network using Perimeter Security (Avolio, F. M. & Ranum 1994) 
As can be seen all outside access will pass through the ‘guards’ of the network, in 
this case a main firewall and a dial-up external access server (Khoussainov & Patel 
2000). The main benefit of using this strategy to secure the network is the ease of 
administration of the security system.  The monitoring logs and security 
configuration can be accessed from a few locations on the network.  
In the early days of network security this protection scheme worked well; the 
external traffic is filtered and internal network is protected from unauthorised outside 
access. However over the years this scheme has proven less effective due to a 
number of reasons. 
Firstly all data passes through only a few systems setup to analyse all of the network 
traffic. This creates a significant burden on the guard systems as the link to the 
outside networks are of considerable size to allow fast access from any internal host. 
This means that the amount of external access will be limited to the speed at which 
the guard devices can process network traffic. Also, any addition of extra filtering 
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logics will compound the issue as new rules will now have to be applied to all of the 
traffic. 
If any of the network guards fail then the organisation will have to stop external 
access while this system is repaired or allow unprotected external access. Both 
options are not attractive to an organisation as either way it will lose productivity 
through non-access or when an internal host gets compromised. 
In perimeter based security each of the internal network hosts is implicitly trusted. 
The idea is that the threats to the network only come from the outside. Although this 
may be the case in many networks it allows the creation of a dangerous scenario. A 
situation may arise where an intruder has gained access to the network and 
penetrated a host. This intruder may now use the transitive trust that exists within this 
network and jump to each host without challenge. 
In addition to this the scheme purports to provide network security by creating a 
stronger doorway and a larger wall. However as Cheswick (Cheswick et al) points 
out “…the attacker only has to win once. It does not matter how thick are your walls, 
nor how lofty your battlements; if an attacker finds one weakness…your system will 
be penetrated” (Cheswick, P11). If an attacker does succeed in getting through the 
defences then, with a bit of skill and knowledge, it will be possible for the attacker to 
gain repeated access to the penetrated network without alerting anyone that this 
situation has occurred. 
The thesis work acknowledges the significant issues with this network protection 
scheme and looks to further develop network security by utilising the features and 
functionality of the next security strategy; host based security. 
2.4.2 Host based Security 
The host based security strategy uses the principle that a secure network is one where 
every machine manages its own protection. This takes the concept of the perimeter 
(see 2.4.1 Perimeter Based Security) and reduces its scope down so that it surrounds 
each individual host. The host based strategy ensures that the operating system 
activities within each host are taken into account when making security decisions 
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(Yeung & Yuxin 2003). Where perimeter based security attempts to protect the 
network through securing the external connections and trusting each internal host 
implicitly; host based security employs a more paranoid view point to trust. Each 
host, within a host based security strategy, is analogous an island in an archipelago; 
they are all within the same cluster but each host (island) is isolated from the others. 
The isolation of each host alters the concept of ‘outside’, or non-trusted areas, to 
anything outside of each individual host. Using the host based security strategy can 
account for the insider threat and attacker penetration because of the reduced usage 
of transitive trust within the network.  
 
Figure 2-8: Host Based Security Strategy 
The host based security strategy is not without drawbacks; there is a greater amount 
of administration due to each host being an individual security system. Another issue 
with the host based approach is that the security system/s used need to be scalable to 
cater for a significant number of hosts. This being the case the security benefits it 
provides is significant. Firstly the security configuration within each host cluster can 
be modified to better fit the host groups that are running the security system/s. Also 
more information can be taken into account with the security system/s being able to 
access all the pertinent host data directly. The host based security strategy is 
appealing for this research because no implicit trust is used and that is more fitting to 
an individual data profiling approach. 
The security strategies mentioned previously are just that; strategies. The strategies 
require mechanisms for actually implementing the security functions. The following 
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is an investigation into the main components that provide computer security within 
either strategy. 
2.4.3 Firewalls 
A firewall is a hardware or software system that filters all traffic between multiple 
connected areas. The term area in this context can be used to denote networks, if 
applied to perimeter security, or the area internal to the host when applied to host 
based security. One of the connected areas is deemed the ‘inside’ region; the area 
that requires protection and can, to a high degree, be trusted. The other area is 
defined as the ‘outside’ region and has restrictions on the information that can arrive 
from this source. The main goal of a firewall is to ensure that only authorised traffic 
is allowed to enter the ‘inside’ area from the ‘outside’ area; the rest is filtered out. 
In order for a firewall to be effective it must possess the following three qualities: 
always be invoked, be tamper-proof, and to be small and simple enough for thorough 
testing. Firewalls are an enforcement of a security policy and as such will not enforce 
the policy correctly if the users can bypass it, can modify the firewall code, or if the 
firewall code is complex; making it susceptible to hidden software bugs. (Pfleeger & 
Pfleeger 2003) 
There are three types of firewalls in existence: packet filtering, application gateways 
and circuit-level gateways. Depending upon the security strategy that the 
organisation applies will determine the types of firewalls in service on the network. 
2.4.3.1 Packet Filtering 
These types of firewalls act at the network layer of the OSI reference model (see 
2.1.1 Data Communication) and look at the headers of each packet to determine 
whether it requires filtering. Packet filters do not look at the data that a packet 
contains, rather it bases all filtering decisions using the addresses and various header 
options of each packet. This type of firewall comprises of a number of rules that are 
designed to best represent the decisions of an organisation’s network policy (Avolio, 
F. 1999). The simple design of this firewall type means that it can be applied to both 
the perimeter based and host based security strategies. In perimeter based security 
this type of firewall would be typically built into the organisation’s routers. This is 
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due to efficiency as all routers are required to look within each packet’s header to 
make routing decisions. So the packet filtering firewall module does not create much 
overhead to the router’s operation. 
2.4.3.2 Application Gateways 
Application gateways, as the name implies, act at the application layer of the OSI 
reference model and examine the application data within a packet stream. The 
application gateways operate by reassembling and analysing the application streams 
as opposed to observing individual packets. Application gateways base filtering 
decisions on application data such as a command set from a specific program, for 
example FTP commands (Ciampa 2005). Due to the processing required in 
rebuilding application data streams the application gateway is mainly used in 
perimeter based security on a separate, dedication machine. However as desktop 
power within an organisation is ever increasing it is becoming more feasible for 
application gateways to reside on each host. 
2.4.3.3 Circuit Level Gateways 
Circuit level gateways or proxy servers operate at the session layer of the OSI model. 
A circuit (or session) is a logical connection that is established between two 
machines for the duration of the communication process (see 2.1.2 Connection-
Oriented and Connection-Less). This type of firewall verifies that the circuit is 
authorised upon initialisation and then establishes the connection on behalf of the 
communicating host (communication by proxy), thereby filtering the connections 
that can be made through the gateway. Circuit gateways operate on the principle that 
packet header forging is easy and prevalent and so shift the analysis and filtering up 
to a higher abstraction level; the session layer (Al-Tawil & Al-Kaltham 1999 ). The 
circuit-level gateway is typically only effective if all internal hosts use it as the proxy 
to the outside world. As such this firewall is typically implemented on a separate 
machine in the perimeter based security strategy. If each host contained a circuit-
level gateway then it would defeat the purpose of this security mechanism; the host 
would be acting as a proxy for itself. 
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2.4.4 Intrusion Detection Systems 
Amoroso (Amoroso 1999) defines the term intrusion detection as “…the process of 
identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing and 
networking resources.” (Amoroso 1999) This definition covers not only intruders 
who are attacking from the outside of a network but also the abusive actions of 
internal users (see 2.3.1 General Intrusion). 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a device that monitors the activity of a 
network in an attempt to identify malicious activity. An analogy of the operation of 
an IDS is that of a burglar alarm; to alert in the event of an intrusion to a secure area. 
Once an IDS has signalled an alert there must be an entity to respond to the alert for 
the system to be effective. The responding entity can be a security expert who 
manually intervenes in the event of an alert, a passive IDS, or it can be an automated 
response module contained within the IDS itself, an active IDS (Janakiraman, 
Waldvogel & Zhang 2003 ). 
Originally intrusion detection was achieved via a system administrator observing a 
console that displayed user activities. The next evolution of intrusion detection was 
through the manual sifting of printed log files. When the storage of electronic 
information became cheaper, the natural progression of the log file to computer 
memory occurred. Prior to this the scanning of the information was not done in real-
time and was only a means to detect an attack after it had occurred. To improve the 
level of security provided by the IDS mechanism, researchers in the early 1990’s 
developed real-time log analysis, which enabled attack detection as it happened. 
Current development into IDS technology has been directed towards the distribution 
of the intrusion detection entities to provide a larger network-wide context 
(Kemmerer & Vigna 2002). In terms of security strategy the IDS can be used in both 
host based and perimeter based security. The IDS originally only appeared in the 
perimeter based security strategy however as the desktop has increased in power it 
has begun integration into host based security strategies. 
Generally an IDS can be classified into two types: signature based and anomaly 
based. The signature based IDS is less complex than the anomaly based IDS and so it 
can be implemented successfully in both perimeter based and host based security 
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strategies. The anomaly-based IDS is complex and processor intensive and is 
typically seen in the perimeter based security strategy. 
 
2.4.5 Signature-Based Intrusion Detection 
Whenever malicious activity occurs on a network it uses a specific process or method 
to execute its attack. This activity exhibits a pattern, or fingerprint, that is unique to 
each individual form of attack. The pattern shows itself in various ways, such as a 
port scan to a range of hosts (Lorimer 2003) or modified TCP packets that are 
distributed throughout a victim network. A signature-based intrusion detection 
system is designed to detect intrusions through the comparison of current network 
data against known, documented malware patterns. When a threat pattern match 
occurs the IDS will alert the system administrator that malicious activity is occurring 
along with information describing the nature of the attack. 
The main issue when deploying a signature-based intrusion detection system as part 
of perimeter based or host based security strategy is with the use of signatures. An 
attacker can and will modify an existing attack so that its new signature will differ 
from the original to such a point that the IDS will no longer identify it as malicious 
activity (Pfleeger & Pfleeger 2003). 
Another problem with signature-based intrusion detection is that it can only match 
malicious activity with known forms of attack. It will not be able to detect new, 
unknown attacks with undocumented attack patterns. In effect the attack has to be 
successful on at least one victim network before a solution is produced. To minimise 
this problem constant maintenance of the signature database is required; a potentially 
costly exercise in dollars as well as the network administrator time. Also how does 
the network administrator react when he/she finds out about a new threat and the 
subsequent patch/update has not been created? Patch creation is a complex process, 
which can take a long time. 
Ideally this system, to have maximum effectiveness, should match known attacks, 
activity that exhibits slight variations on existing patterns, as well as be able to 
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discriminate attacks from normal traffic on the network. Due to the rigid nature of 
the signature-based IDS organisations are tending towards using anomaly-based 
intrusion detection approaches 
2.4.6 Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection 
In anomaly detection the IDS creates a profile of acceptable usage for the users. The 
user profiles that are developed are used for comparison with current network data to 
detect abnormal, potentially malicious, traffic. The construction of this type of 
detection mechanism begins by determining what is normal for the observed user. 
The system then needs to determine the thresholds of each activity to flag as 
abnormal, and which activities to prioritise security decisions on. The detection 
principle for such a system is that it flags behaviour that is unlikely to originate from 
normal user activity, without any regard to actual intrusion situational data (Axelsson 
2000). 
The issue with using the anomaly-based intrusion detection approach is the problem 
of identifying correct, normal behaviour. The profiling requires that the user 
complete all the tasks that they would normally undertake over a protracted period. 
This being the case it typically takes a significant amount of time to develop a profile 
for each user as well as to extract the key features from the data. For the profiling to 
be truly successful in identifying the normal behaviour the user has to know in 
advanced all of the applications that they will be using as well as any other task that 
they would undertake, such as file transfers and database access. 
2.4.7 Anti-Virus Solutions 
An anti-virus program is a process that attempts to eradicate viruses by identifying 
any viral behaviours occurring on the system and then extracting the malicious code 
attachments. Anti-virus software operates in two ways: signature based and heuristic 
based. 
When a computer virus is reported the virus is examined by anti-virus software 
developers and a signature file is created to be used for detection and eradication 
purposes. The virus signature file is added to the anti-virus software database and is 
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used for viral identification when a computer is later scanned. This method of viral 
detection is always reactive; someone must be infected and report the infection 
before a signature file of the virus is created. This is a significant problem because if 
the virus has a particularly effective means of propagation then by the time the 
corrective patch and signature is created the organisation may have already been 
infected. In addition, with signature-based anti-virus, if the signature database is not 
up to date then it will be, in practical terms, useless because it will not provide 
protection for recently identified viruses. 
The other technique employed by anti-virus software for viral identification is to use 
heuristic based mechanism. Heuristics are rules of thumb gained from experiences 
that act as an intelligent guide (Giarratano & Riley 1998) for the anti-virus software 
that is monitoring the host. The anti-virus software uses the heuristics to determine 
whether a program is exhibiting viral activity and if so attempts to eradicate the 
virus. An issue with this heuristic technique is the determining that virus activity 
occurring mainly due to the fact that heuristics act as guides rather than provide a 
guarantee of virus detection. Another issue is that applications will have features that 
are similar to the activities of a virus (eg. replication). This can cause problems with 
numerous false alarms which can train the user to ignore false alarms as well as 
positive virus results (Surfer Beware 2004). 
After investigation into networks, security, threats and their counter measures it 
becomes obvious how dynamic the entire domain is. Dynamic network traffic, 
security strategies implemented, the constant creation of new threats, and mutations 
of existing threats ensure that any inflexible security monitoring system will be of 
little use. The underlying technique used within a monitoring system must be flexible 
and adaptable to match the highly dynamic nature of the domain. Expert system 
techniques have been developed to solve solutions that are dynamic in nature. Expert 
systems can solve problems in domains where conventional techniques fail. 
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2.5 Expert Systems 
Expert Systems are field within of artificial intelligence (AI) that uses specialised 
knowledge in a particular domain in an attempt to solve problems at the level of a 
human expert. The knowledge in expert systems may be either expertise or 
knowledge that is generally available from knowledgeable people as well as from 
other sources, such as academic reference in the domain. An expert system typically 
consists of the knowledge base, the working memory, the inference engine and some 
type of user interface (Luger 2002). 
 
Figure 2-9: The Expert System Structure (Gallant 1988) 
 
The knowledge base is the expert knowledge of a particular domain that is 
semantically structured in a form for the specific expert system. The working 
memory is used for storage of the artefacts derived from the reasoning process. 
These artefacts are asserted facts and temporary conclusions that have been deduced 
by the inference engine. The inference engine applies the situational knowledge to 
the solution of actual problems. The actions of the inference engine are analogous to 
that of an interpreter for the knowledge base (Luger 2002). 
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2.6 Rule Based Expert System 
One of the more popular types of expert systems in use today is the rule-based expert 
system. The rule-based system represents its expert knowledge in the form of a 
structured sequence of rules. A rule is data that generally conforms to highly 
specialised grammars capable of using symbolic representations to define the 
conditions and actions (Hayes-Roth 1985 ).  
These rules are expressed in the form: 
if <conditions> then <actions> 
Where if the conditions are true then the actions are executed (Griffin & Lewis 
1998). The rules are used by the inference engine to determine the output or 
conclusions that the system should produce given the situational data. 
The rule-based approach is popular due to a number of advantages that this form of 
expert system presents. The modular nature of the rule-based approach means that it 
is easy to encapsulate knowledge and expand the expert system via incremental 
development. Each new conclusion that the rule based system produces is added as 
an extension of the structured sequence of rules. Another benefit of the rule-based 
approach is that it is easy to build in explanation facilities with the rules because the 
antecedents of a rule specify what the necessary elements are to satisfy the rule. By 
keeping track of the rules that have been activated, an explanation facility can 
present the chain of reasoning undertaken to produce a certain conclusion. In 
addition the rules are structured, as a listing of IF..THEN statements, which makes it 
easier to explain to the expert the structure of the knowledge that is required of them 
(Giarratano & Riley 1998). 
 
2.7 Classical Knowledge Acquisition 
As discussed previously (2.5 Expert Systems) expert systems utilise specialised 
knowledge in a specific domain in order to solve problems. As such, the knowledge 
from an expert source, whether it is a human of literature, needs to be extracted to 
provide the basis for the problem solver. There are a number of possible techniques 
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that are used to extract relevant information for analysis; a few of these are detailed 
below. 
2.7.1 Decision Trees 
Decision trees are a way to represent rules by underlying data with hierarchical, 
sequential structures that recursively separate the data. A decision tree can be used 
for data analysis to provide descriptions and classification of the data that is being 
analysed. The description of data involves the reduction of a volume of data by 
transforming it into a more compact form that preserves the essential characteristics 
and provides an accurate summary. The classification of data is achieved through 
discovering whether the data contains any well defined, separate classes of objects, 
such that the classes can be meaningfully interpreted in the context of a substantive 
theory (Murthy 1998). Decision tree classifiers have been successfully used in many 
diverse fields such as radar signal classification, character recognition, remote 
sensing, expert systems and speech recognition. A benefit of using decision trees is 
their capability to break down a complex decision making process into a collection of 
simpler decisions, providing a solution that is often easier to interpret. Advantages of 
the use of decision tree based classification have been demonstrated (Murthy 1998). 
Knowledge acquisition from pre-classified examples can alleviate the bottleneck of 
knowledge acquisition from a domain expert. In addition to this the decision trees 
perform classification by a sequence of simple, easy to understand tests whose 
semantics are intuitively clear to domain experts. The main drawback of decision tree 
classification is that within decision tree classification there is a trade off between 
optimising efficiency and accuracy; for any given accuracy there is a bound on the 
efficiency (Safavian & Landgrebe 1991).   
2.7.2 Neural Networks 
Neural networks, also known as connectionist systems, steer away from the use of 
symbols in problem solving. Instead the intelligence aspect of neural networks arises 
from the simple interactions of the components through a process of learning by 
which the connections between these components are adjusted. The implementer of a 
neural network must create an encoding scheme that translates real world 
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information into numerical quantities within the network. The choice of encoding 
scheme will determine the eventual success or failure of the network to learn the 
solution to the problem. Neural networks have been applied to a number of tasks 
such as classification, pattern recognition, memory recall, prediction, optimisation, 
and noise filtering (Luger 2002). 
The use of neural networks in the field of pattern recognition has been promising. 
Wiener (Wiener, Pederson & Weigend 1995) successfully demonstrated a neural 
network that has been used for topic spotting within a large data set. It demonstrated 
a number of advantages for pattern recognition that other techniques would not have 
provided. The system that was developed, from a practical standpoint, could be put 
in place relatively quickly when compared to hand-crafted systems. In addition this 
system was flexible and would adapt to the data environment that it was placed in. 
However a drawback to using neural networks systems is that once they present a 
solution to the problem there is no discernable rule linked with the data that is 
extracted. The extracted data is held in a machine readable, or neural network, format 
that is of no use to a human expert (Wiener, Pederson & Weigend 1995). 
2.7.3 Data Mining and Machine Learning 
Data mining is defined as the process of discovering patterns within a data set. In 
data mining, the data is electronically stored and the searching is automated by a 
computer process. The concept is to build computer programs that sift through data 
archives automatically, seeking regularities or patterns. The patterns that the data 
mining discovers are meaningful and provide some advantage, normally an 
economical advantage (Witten & Frank 2000). The patterns that are found are used 
to make predictions about any new data obtained. 
Learning has many philosophical descriptions, such as to gain knowledge or an 
understanding of a topic of interest. The terms ‘machine learning’ describe the 
process of a machine changing its underlying structures or data so that it’s expected 
future performance improves (Nilsson 1996). Machine learning and data mining are 
intrinsically tied together by the common goal of increased performance. In data 
mining the performance goal is the ability to make better predictions based on the 
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patterns that have been determined. Applications of data mining and machine 
learning have included selecting embryos for fertilisation, selecting cows to cull from 
a milking stock and analysing stock market figures. 
Applying data mining and machine learning to any domain of interest has problems 
that need to be addressed. Data mining techniques work well at finding any patterns 
within a given dataset. Data mining finds patterns without regard to what the patterns 
are actually showing. There is a requirement by an expert to sift through the patterns 
and classify the relevant ones and discard the rest. Machine learning before they can 
‘learn’ have a pre-requisite that the training data is pre-defined and pre-classified. 
This requirement limits the real-time possibilities of machine learning applications. 
An expert will have had to have analysed the data and classified it before it is 
inputted into the system. 
 
2.8 Expert System Issues 
Although expert systems have been proven to work effectively in the field, like 
MYCIN (Shortliffe 1976), these systems have exhibited various problems. 
The process of formalising the knowledge of the expert, in a particular domain, into 
rules is not a simple, especially when the expert’s knowledge has never been 
systematically explored. There may be inconsistencies, ambiguities, duplications, or 
other problems with the expert’s knowledge that are not apparent until attempts are 
made to formally represent this knowledge in an expert system. 
Another issue is that expert systems are explicitly designed to deal with uncertainty; 
they will make recommendations with the same confidence regardless of the 
accuracy or completeness of the data that it used to come to a conclusion. An expert 
system’s advice, like that of a human expert, should degrade gracefully as it reaches 
the boundaries of ignorance; the limits of knowledge the expert system contains. 
In addition many expert systems do not have facilities to represent causal knowledge. 
The expert systems do not have an understanding of the causes and effects in the 
underlying system. It is easier to program expert systems with shallow knowledge 
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based on empirical and heuristic knowledge than with deep knowledge as to the 
structures and objects within the problem domain (Giarratano & Riley 1998). 
Expert system performance within their specialised domains is excellent, however 
hardly any of them have common sense knowledge; an ability possessed by most 
humans. This lack of common sense makes a lot of these systems difficult to extend 
beyond their original scope as the system does not know the extent of their 
limitations; their boundaries of ignorance (McCarthy 1984). 
 
2.9 The Knowledge Paradigm Shift 
The techniques described in 2.7 Classical Knowledge Acquisition are defined as the 
classic expert system approaches. Thorough applications of these systems have 
identified a number of issues in their use within particular domains. Each of these 
approaches do have significant benefits however only when the domains are 
restricted to a subset of all domains. For example Neural Networks have proven to be 
excellent in the games domain (Moriarty & Miikkulainen 1995) (Richards, Moriarty 
& Miikkulainen 1998), and data mining and machine learning in the domain of 
statistical analysis (Hastie, Tibshirani & Friedman 2001) (Glymour et al. 1997).  
The concerns that arose from using expert systems were that there would be a need to 
use a specific expert system for any given domain. There was no general problem 
solver that could be applied to many diverse domains (Kang, Compton & Preston 
1995). This lead to further investigation into the underlying representation of 
knowledge and understanding in the hope that if this is better understood then it 
could be applied to an expert system that covered many domains, no matter the 
structures of knowledge that the domain uses. 
It was discovered that in previous expert systems the expert was required to model a 
domain using his/her experiences and adapting them to fit a common logic. This 
process was difficult because it was found that experts have trouble trying to model 
the domain using this rigid process. A number of key issues were found with this 
domain modelling process. 
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If the expert was interviewed by the expert system designer then the expert would 
adapt their explanation to fit the level of understanding of the designer. This is a 
significant problem because the true meaning of the domain information would be 
lost through this simplification process. It was found that the expert would do this 
unknowingly even though the interviewer explicitly asked for the correct knowledge 
in unadulterated form (Kang 2005). 
Another issue was that the expert would typically have gaps in his/her knowledge 
and not know everything about the domain. When a situation arose where the expert 
did not have the required understanding then he/she would consult other experts or 
literature in order to fill these gaps. So in the end the expert would be able to provide 
a solution to all problems however the expert was typically unaware of these gaps 
until the specific unknown situation occurred. It is impossible to know everything 
that is unknown, the gaps, in any domain of interest (Compton et al. 1991). 
Observations of the experts working in a domain revealed that the reason that the 
expert came to a certain conclusion was that he/she had reasoned off case 
information and had flexible representational logic in their mind that provided the 
conclusion. An example is a doctor diagnosing a patient, when the doctor hears the 
patient’s symptoms the doctor will extract the key elements, use his/her experience to 
make a educated prediction of what the problem is, then extract case data that had 
similar matching symptoms to confirm his conclusion. The previous case data may 
not be identical to this current situation but the doctor is able to use experience to 
adapt the interpretations of the data or discard and select another case if it is not 
pertinent to the current situation (Compton et al. 1991). 
The issues with expert systems, knowledge acquisition, and knowledge 
representation were becoming a limiting factor of expert system expansion in 
numerous domains. A new approach to expert systems and knowledge needed to be 
investigated to produce a system that worked over multiple domains (Compton & 
Jansen 1989). This research lead to the development of Case Based Reasoning and 
later on the Ripple Down Rule based approaches. 
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2.10 Case Based Reasoning 
Case based reasoning is the process of reasoning using previous experience as a 
guide. Case based reasoning solves problems by using the experiences of the 
previous situation and retrieving the data that relates to that situation. The previous 
data is then used to identify possible problems with the solution being computed, 
interpret the new situation and create conclusions based off the past. The case data, 
once extracted, can also be used to find arguments that justify a conclusion, whether 
it is past or present (Kolodner 1991). The interpretations of the new situations are 
based off comparison and contrasting the new situation with the old ones and 
adapting them to fit. When a new conclusion has been made the situational data is 
added back into the memory to be used for future reasoning processes (Aamodt & 
Plaza 1994). The case based reasoning technique has been further developed through 
the creation of Ripple Down Rules and its successor Multiple Classification Ripple 
Down Rules. 
 
2.11 Ripple Down Rules  
Ripple Down Rules (RDR) is a knowledge acquisition method, based off case based 
reasoning, that attempts to constrain the interactions between the expert and the 
expert system shell to acquire only correct knowledge. RDR has come from the 
analysis of the way that experts attempt to provide domain knowledge for an expert 
system. Shaw (Shaw 1988) has demonstrated that experts may have quite different 
and inconsistent knowledge of a domain but are able to freely communicate 
knowledge with each other. Previous observation of experts during the maintenance 
phase of an expert system suggests that experts do not provide information on how 
they reached a specific judgement. Rather the expert tends to provide justifications 
that their judgement is correct. The problem with this is that the justification varies 
with the context and has to be engineered to fit in with the other knowledge that 
exists in the knowledge base (Compton et al. 1991). 
The context of RDR is defined as the sequence of rules that are evaluated and have 
lead to a wrong conclusion, or no conclusion at all. When a rule with a new 
conclusion is appended to a RDR knowledge base, this rule is only evaluated after 
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the same sequence of rules is evaluated. The resulting structure is a set of sequence 
rules (IF…ELSEIF rules) containing exceptions which can themselves be ordered 
rules (Kang, Compton & Preston 1995). 
The benefits of using of RDR include (Kang, Compton & Preston 1995): 
The expert does not need to have knowledge about the structure of the knowledge 
and how the system attaches the rules to it. From the expert’s viewpoint the rule is 
composed of whatever generality is preferred and the system handles the location of 
this rule. This is because all rule addition is prompted by the system misclassifying 
or failing to classify a case. 
The use of RDR shifts the development emphasis of the expert system to the 
maintenance cycle by blurring the distinction between the initial development and 
maintenance stages. The difficulty of adding a rule to an RDR system is the same 
regardless of how long a knowledge base has been under development and how large 
it is. This feature allows the development of the knowledge base to evolve along with 
development of domain expertise.  
A limitation of RDR is that the knowledge base may be ill structured due the experts 
initially adding rules that are too specific. Initially adding rules that are too specific 
result in numerous corrections rules which create an unbalanced RDR tree. In 
addition the RDR rule adding process is conducive to repetition of knowledge that 
already exists in the knowledge base. 
Finally another problem with RDR is that there may be situations where multiple 
classifications may be required, for example if a patient has multiple independent 
diseases. The ripple down rule approach provides only a single interpretation, 
although this conclusion may contain a number of parts. A proposed solution to this 
is to produce separate rule trees. However this can lead to rule repetition because the 
information that is present in one tree may be required in the other domain tree 
(Compton et al. 1991). This problem was the driving force behind the creation of an 
extended RDR technique called Multiple Classification Ripple Down Rules 
(MCRDR). 
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2.12 Multiple Classification Ripple Down Rules  
The aim of MCRDR is to preserve the advantages and strategy that has been 
developed by RDR and extend it to deal with multiple independent classifications. 
MCRDR, like RDR, is based on the assumption that the knowledge an expert 
provides is essentially a justification for a conclusion in a particular context. 
The main benefit of using MCRDR as a knowledge acquisition strategy is that 
MCRDR can be the basis for the development of a general problem solver in used in 
many different problem domains, with multiple classification requirements. MCRDR 
allows the development of expert systems in a domain without having to pick the 
expert system that works best in that domain (see 2.9 The Knowledge Paradigm 
Shift). Another benefit discovered in the use of MCRDR is that it shows much 
greater complexity over that of its predecessor RDR without increasing the 
knowledge acquisition required for a single classification domain. The flexibility and 
usability of MCRDR means that it is the technique of choice for this research. The 
underlying processes and operations of MCRDR are further explored in the 
methodology section detailed later.  
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Summation of Background Issues 
The background provided through research of network security and expert system 
areas have laid the foundations for understanding the techniques that are needed and 
used with implementing a distributed security monitoring system. The following is a 
discussion of the issues that are the motivation for the investigation into a more 
efficient and flexible distributed monitoring system. 
Network security is typically achieved through reactive measures such as applying 
patches to vulnerable machines and security software. When security is achieved in 
this manner it means that there always has to be a victim network that has been 
devastated before any rectification efforts are made. Meanwhile the threat will still 
be seeking out and attacking other victim networks. If an organisation is the first 
network to be hit by a new threat then there will be no counter-measures that a 
security expert can use to stop the threat.  
This being the case there are security mechanisms, such as anomalous based threat 
detection, that can potentially identify this new threat and allow some sort of 
response; typically through isolation. These anomalous based threat detection 
mechanisms work by providing some sort of abstraction of the activity that is 
occurring on a system. The abstraction is provided so that the security expert will not 
have to observe every packet in order to find new threat patterns.  
When looking at the abstracted activity the security expert will generally set, or have 
a mental image of, the activity thresholds that indicate normal activity and that 
activity which indicates an attack. When the security expert determines the threshold 
activity he/she will have to be careful to not set it too low or too high. If the threshold 
is set too low then the anomalous detection system will produce numerous false 
positives. The security expert will have to respond to every alarm in case it is a 
threat. Too many false positives will typically condition a dismissive attitude within 
the security expert; assuming that a majority of alarms are false and possibly missing 
a real alarm. If the threshold is set too high it will mean that the anomalous detection 
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system will only alarm on specific threat patterns. In this situation the false positives 
are greatly reduced however this comes at the expense of a potentially unidentified 
attack. Missing any attack defeats the purpose of having an anomalous threat 
detection system installed on the network. What is required of such a system is the 
ability to have a threshold indicator that can be flexibly and dynamically adjusted by 
the security expert. 
To compound the threshold issue the anomalous detection system will typically use a 
generalised configuration that is applied to all machines. If it is not a network-wide 
common configuration then it is a configuration used for very generic classes of 
machines, such as all workstations and all servers. The generality of this 
configuration is a limiting factor in the anomalous detection system’s ability to detect 
new threats. The main reason for the limitation is that a single general configuration 
that will identify all threats for every single host on a network does not exist. The 
reason for this is that each system may have completely individual roles. The 
workstation/server roles are the classic example of this. However on every network 
there are actually roles within the roles rather than just the general abstract 
categories. For example instead of just the overarching concept of the server there 
are DNS servers, E-Mail Servers, File Servers, SQL Servers, etc. The same principle 
applies to workstations on a network. There are graphics-oriented workstations, 
general office workstations, financial-oriented workstations, etc. Each individual role 
will create dynamic behaviours and traffic patterns for the differing systems.  
In addition to the differing roles of the hosts another important factor that increases 
the dynamic environment of the network is that even though two systems may have 
the same roles there will be two different users working on those machines. The 
users will achieve the same tasks on those workstations but in a different manner. 
Hypothetically one user may work diligently on a task until completion and then use 
the Internet in the slack time while the other may work on the task while 
intermittently using E-mail facilities. From this hypothetical it can be seen that these 
two user’s computers will display different traffic patterns and characteristics even 
though the computers have identical roles. Provision of an effective security 
monitoring scheme will require the factoring in of the individual roles that each host 
plays as well as the differing user activity on those hosts.  
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Another consideration of security monitoring systems is the choice of architecture 
that they employ; centralised or distributed. Centralised systems use a central 
controller that determines the actions of the subordinate components. In terms of 
security monitor system this means that each host will report abstract activity data to 
the central monitor which will then make a determination of the action (considering 
in-action as a form of action) that the subordinate host will complete (Banatre 1991). 
Distributed systems push the processing operations out to the individual hosts so that 
each host can determine for itself the correct course of action. Each host within the 
distributed framework will contain agent software that is self-contained and has all of 
the necessary functionality to achieve the intended goal, in term of this research, 
security monitoring (Wulf, Wang & Kienzle 1996 ). The selection of security system 
architecture will affect what overall operations and information that is available for 
the system. Within a centralised architecture each monitoring host functions as a 
reporter for the governing central analyser. This means that the only information that 
the analyser has to work with is the abstracted traffic data that each host reports. This 
abstract data is typically to general for proper analysis. Another drawback of the 
centralised architecture is the amount of reported traffic that flows on the monitored 
network. This reporting traffic consumes bandwidth as well as having to be catered 
for in the analysis process. One last obvious drawback of the centralised approach is 
that if the central controller is taken down then the system does not function. 
Centralised architectures were the deployment of choice in the early years of 
computing. One reason for this was that the hosts of the period had limited 
processing capabilities so a distributed architecture, with agent processing on each 
host, would have been prohibitive. However after extensive use of centralised 
monitoring systems in the field and observations of its short-comings there has been 
a deviation, in the security domain, toward the use of distributed architectures 
(Massie, Chun & Culler 2004). The main benefit of distribution that has caused the 
architectural shift is that each agent does all the analysis, processing, and action 
determination on each host independent of the other hosts. This means that the agent 
can focus on the monitoring of the host, thereby providing an in-depth analysis of 
this host. The benefits that distribution provides are attractive to the creation of a 
monitoring system mainly due to possibility of each agent being individualistic. The 
use of distribution means that the research system uses the host based security 
strategy (described in 2.4.2 Host based Security) 
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3.2 The Aims of the System 
The aim of the system is to address the issues that have been previously discussed. 
To be successful in detecting unknown attacks the system will need to possess the 
following features. 
The system is able adapt to the dynamic environment of networks. This caters for the 
fact that traffic on networks is always changing due to factors such as new network 
protocols and software. In addition to this the attacks that are occurring are changing 
dynamically as old attacks mutate and new attacks are formulated. To facilitate this 
feature the system uses an expert system in order to develop a constantly evolving 
knowledge base. The evolving knowledge base requires a system to provide easy 
maintenance of the knowledge it contains. To provide this feature for the knowledge 
base the system will use the multiple classification ripple down rules artificial 
intelligence technique. This technique allows flexible logic structure and the easy 
maintenance and addition of new logics within the knowledge base. It also provides 
constraints and validation to ensure the any new entered logics or refinement of the 
existing logics do not corrupt the existing knowledge base.  
In addition to the network being dynamic a number of differing types of host exist 
within the network. The role that each host plays needs to be factored into the 
operation of the security monitoring system. To factor this in the entire system uses 
the distribution architecture. Each monitored host will have the system installed 
which can be tailored individually for that specific host. In this way each host will be 
monitored and each system can be adapted for the varying network conditions.  
A monitoring system that creates too many false positives will induce a dismissive 
attitude in the security expert. As this monitoring system produces more false alarms 
the security expert will be more likely to ignore each alarm as another false positive. 
This repeated generation of false alarms within a monitoring system occurs because 
of over generalised logics that are used for identifying an attack. In addition the 
thresholds for the network activities could be set too low. The system solves this 
problem by using a flexible logic engine where the thresholds can be dynamically 
adjusted and the logics adapted to better identify the threats. The flexibility of 
operation stems from the use of the underlying MCRDR processes. 
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To produce a system that will be effective at identifying unknown threats it must 
allow the expert to quickly create some sort of response to the attack. The response 
may be to isolate the machines and/or subnet that are showing signs of infection or 
attack. Such a drastic response may not be possible because it will limit 
organisational functionality and the infection or attack may have already moved on 
to other machines and subnets. A better solution would be to analyse and identify the 
patterns exhibited on the infected system and then take that information and apply it 
to the other untouched machines. Then when infection appears on the other machine 
the patterns are already identified and the responsive measures are already in place. 
The system developed allows this through a knowledge importing mechanism as well 
as the underlying MCRDR processes that allow the knowledge to be adapted to 
better suit the recipient system. The response time in the system is improved because 
of the easy interface to and management of the underlying logics contained within 
each monitoring system. The usage of MCRDR within each monitoring system 
ensures quick and correct logic refinement or creation. This logic also includes the 
situational data at the time of the logic adaptation or creation for future reference. 
The expert can look at the situation data for any logic developed and use this to 
reason about a new situation or check that the original conclusion was correct. 
The final aim of the research is to prove that the MCRDR technique can be 
successfully applied in the network security domain. The proof of this concept is 
demonstrated by the ability of the security monitoring system to achieve the goals 
aforementioned.  
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3.3 An Unknown Threat Scenario 
To better demonstrate the principles of the monitoring system investigation into a 
hypothetical attack scenario is necessary. Consider the following unknown attack 
scenario: 
 
Figure 3-1: Unknown Attack Scenario 
This diagram shows a small organisational sub-network with nine hosts and a server. 
In the figure the following is occurring: 
1. An unknown attack has breached the organisation and is beginning to run 
rampart on the organisation sub-network. 
2. The unknown attack compromises its first host and symptoms are beginning 
to be exhibited on the host. The monitoring system on the host detects the 
change in activity and sends an alert to the security expert (typically the 
network administrator). 
3. The unknown attack seeks out a new victim and compromises another host. 
This host shows symptoms of infection as it differs from normal activities. 
The monitoring system sends another alert to the security expert. The expert 
at this stage will be getting wary that something suspicious is occurring on 
the sub-network. 
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4. The unknown attack has found and compromised a third host. Once again this 
host identifies the new activity and sends an alert to the security expert. 
Typically this would be enough to confirm the expert’s suspicion and he/she 
will proceed to begin investigation as to what is occurring on the sub-
network. 
5. The expert checks the infected machines through interfacing with the 
monitoring system. The expert will see that a new attack is taking place and 
will use the monitoring system interface to identify the patterns that this new, 
previously unknown attack is exhibiting. The expert will create identifying 
logics, based on the attack patterns, within the monitoring system. These 
logics will also include the situational data which were used for analysis and 
logic creation.  
6. The security expert will then takes the created logics and situational data and 
import it to other uncompromised hosts. These logics that identify the new, 
now known, attack and are linked to some sort of proactive action that will 
prevent the uncompromised machines from getting infected. 
7. While this security expert is applying the logics to the other uncompromised 
machines the attack is still occurring and has compromised another host 
which did not have the logics and hence no proactive measures. Once again 
this compromised host will detect the new symptoms and send an alert to the 
security expert. However the expert is already fully aware of the situation and 
is already doing something about it. 
8. The security expert arrives at the server and imports the logics and situational 
data into its monitoring system. However these logics may not be completely 
correct for the operations of this server. So the expert will refine and adapt 
the logics for this monitoring system so that it incorporates the operations of 
this server. This process ensures that the server will be protected without 
creating numerous false alarms, which as aforementioned will breed a 
dismissive attitude into the security expert. 
The final step in this scenario is to do something with the already compromised 
machines. This research does not focus on what occurs at this point however the 
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security expert has many options. For example the expert can isolate each of the 
compromised machines and do a reformat and reinstall of the original configuration. 
The main issue for this scenario is the time it takes the expert to analysis, identify 
patterns and create logics for the new unknown attacks. It is proposed that using 
MCRDR processes within the monitoring system will decrease response times to the 
attack scenario demonstrated above when compared to other forms of logic creation 
that could have been used. 
 
3.4 Rule Tree 
MCRDR uses a tree-like structure for containing, analysing and extracting the logics 
or rules for any system. In the implemented system a tree data structure was created 
in addition to the functions for interacting with the rule structure. Each rule within 
the tree contains the pointer/s to the cornerstone case data associated with them for 
later extraction and analysis. 
The expert does not have to manipulate the rule tree directly. The interactions with 
the rule tree were through the monitoring system interface. The process of rule 
addition, refinement and manipulation within the system are transparent to ensure 
that the knowledge base does not get corrupted and to not burden the expert with 
undue operations.   
 
3.5 MCRDR Knowledge Acquisition 
The process of acquiring knowledge in a generalised MCRDR system is 
demonstrated by the flowchart in Figure 3-2.  
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Figure 3-2: System Knowledge Acquisition Process (Kang et al. 1997) 
The process of knowledge acquisition in terms of the security monitoring system is 
as follows: 
1. The packet capturing module is started and it begins acquiring network traffic 
data. 
2. The case time period elapses and the case data is created. 
3. The case data is fed through to the inference engine and the MCRDR process 
begins. Firstly each rule on the first level is compared with the case data to 
see whether the conditions are satisfied. If the rule is satisfied it is fired and 
the children of this rule are considered. This process repeats with the children 
and so forth until none of the fired rule’s children has fired. The last rule node 
in the tree to have fired along any branch becomes the conclusion for the rule. 
This means that there is the possibility of multiple conclusions for this case. 
4. The current case data and the conclusion information, such as which rule 
concluded with what, is displayed to the expert via the system interface. If 
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there is no conclusion then a new classification needs to be made and the 
interface displays this fact. 
5. The expert determines whether the conclusion was correct or not by 
observing the case data and what conclusions where produced with which 
rule. If it was correct then repeat process from step 2. Otherwise the 
conclusion was not correct and so the expert selects which rules concluded 
incorrectly or to adds a completely new classification. 
6. If the expert has determined that a rule has concluded incorrectly then the 
expert is shown the different conditions between one of the cornerstone cases 
that exist for the incorrect rule and the current case data. The cornerstone list 
that exists for the incorrect rule is also displayed. The expert selects various 
conditions from the difference list and then validates the conditions for the 
new rule. Any of the cornerstone cases that do not satisfy the conditions are 
removed from the displayed list leaving only the ones that are satisfied by the 
selected conditions. The expert can select the cornerstone cases that he/she 
wishes to let match this rule’s conditions. If the expert selects all of the 
remaining cornerstones to let match then the new rule is valid and is added as 
a refinement (child) of the incorrect rule with the selected conditions and the 
current case data as the cornerstone. Otherwise the expert is presented with 
the differences between the current case and one of the remaining 
cornerstones. This process continues until there are no cornerstones in the list 
or the expert select the all of the remaining cornerstone case data that will be 
allowed to match. Then the new rule is added as a refinement of the incorrect 
rule with the conditions selected and the current case data as the cornerstone. 
When the new rule is created go back to step 2 of this process. 
7. If the expert has selected to create a new classification then the same process 
occurs as in step 7 however the cornerstone case list contains every 
cornerstone case currently contained within the monitoring system. In this 
situation the condition list from which the expert can select from is all of the 
conditions of the current case data. The new rule, with its selected conditions 
and cornerstone case, is added as a top level rule (child of the root) so that it 
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will become a new branch of reasoning for the MCRDR process to follow. 
When the new classification is created go back to step 2 of this process. 
8. While the expert is interacting with the rule tree structure the packet 
capturing module is still capturing packets and creating cases but the 
inference module will wait until the expert has dealt with the current working 
case. The created cases are buffered (put in the database) until the expert has 
finished working and created a new conclusion or indicated that the current 
case is correct. This ensures that real time operation can continue without 
interrupting the expert and also it ensures that any new rules (logics) that the 
expert creates on this current case get applied to the cases following. 
3.5.1 Validation Process 
In addition to the validation process ensuring that the new logics do not incorrectly 
fire an existing logic the system also checks to see whether the conditions are valid. 
This is because the conditions are displayed but they are able to be edited. If the 
edited condition does not satisfy the existing case data then it is deemed invalid and 
must be corrected. The invalidation continues until the edited condition satisfies the 
existing case data 
3.5.2 Rules Types 
There are three types of rules that exist within the system. These types of rules 
determine what occurs within the inference module as well as the location of the 
newly created rule type. 
Refinement rules are the typical rules that are created to provide a new conclusion 
for a wrongly classifying rule. The conclusion of this rule will replace the conclusion 
of the parent rule if its conditions are satisfied. The location of a new refinement rule 
is as a child of the parent rule (the rule that gave the wrong classification).  
Stopping rules are rules that have conditions, which when satisfied, will cause the 
parent rule of this rule to not fire, in other words fire a NULL conclusion. The 
location of the newly created stopping rule is at one of the child positions of the 
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parent rule (the rule that gave the wrong classification). Stopping rules play a major 
role in MCRDR in preventing wrong classifications being given for a case. 
New classification rules are rules that provide a completely new branch of reasoning 
and are not associated with any other rule (other than root). When the rule and 
conditions have been validated the newly created rule is added as a child of the root. 
 
3.6 System Design 
The following is the abstract design of the system. The thing to observe is that the 
network traffic thread, and hence packet capturing, is executed in parallel with the 
main system thread. Parallel execution allows the real-time execution of the 
monitoring system without packet loss. 
 
Figure 3-3: Overall System Design 
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3.7 Real-time Issues 
3.7.1 Packet Loss 
In order to detect attacks in progress the system must collect every packet that is 
received or sent on the host network card. If any packets are not captured then it will 
impede the knowledge acquisition process. The lost packets may contain information 
that is vital to an attack pattern being detected.  
With this issue in mind the system was designed such that the packet capturing 
engine is run in parallel with the other system processes. To ensure that the packet 
capturing engine was not losing packets (by not processing them) it needed to be 
tested against another packet capturing tool. A freely available packet capturing 
software called Ethereal was used for comparison purposes. Ethereal is not a 
commercial product however the underlying engine has been used in a number of 
commercially used products. From this, it is concluded that the Ethereal software is 
sound and operates correctly.  
Tests were conducted where the packet capturing engine and Ethereal were run 
concurrently over differing periods of time. Over the time period logs were created 
by the packet capturing engine and Ethereal. These logs were then compared to 
identify any packets that the packet capturing engine may have missed and that 
Ethereal found. After many such experiments it was deemed that packet capturing 
engine operated successfully and all packets were correctly identified. 
3.7.2 Case Window Size: 
The time interval between cases being created is the window size. The window size 
determines the amount of network traffic is inputted into the analysis engine before 
the case is created. The selection of the window period will affect the overall system 
in a number of ways. 
Having the window size set to a small value will mean that there won’t be much data 
to build a case from. The patterns for detecting anomalous behaviour will be very 
specific. A small window size may also mean that anomalous patterns may be 
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misclassified as normal traffic as the expert will not see all of the information 
relevant to an attack 
Having the window size set to a large value will mean that there will be a significant 
amount of data processed before a case is created. A large window size forces the 
system to deal with a significant amount data and the resultant memory requirements. 
For example a ping flood attack was analysed which produce over ten thousand 
packets in ten seconds. This overflowed the buffer, the IP array, designated to hold 
the address information and the system began writing into operating system memory. 
The large window size may also mean that data representing an attack may be hidden 
within a significant amount of normal traffic. This issue is reduced by the system 
creating a case from summary information; however an expert may miss an attack 
pattern from the amount of information from which to make a classification.  
 
Figure 3-4: A 30 Second Window 
As can be seen from the above figure a 30 second window size will correctly see the 
sharp rise and fall of the e-mail activity. This activity may be a potential indicator of 
anomalous behaviour. Figure 3-5 shows the same data but using a minute time slice. 
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Figure 3-5: A 60 Second Window 
As can be seen the data over the minute interval will be summarised and the sharp 
rise and fall of the activity will be generalised to a large amount of e-mail activity in 
that time slice.  
Another issue that arises from having a large window size is that within a given 
windowing period multiple attacks may occur. An expert may identify the combined 
attack pattern as a single attack that has elements of both individual attacks. However 
this issue isn’t significant as over the course of time the expert will classify each of 
these attacks with more specific rules. 
In the experiments the window size was set to twenty seconds. The packet capturing 
module obtains information from the network for twenty seconds and then it analyses 
the data, builds summary information of that data, and then creates a case. While the 
analysis engine computes the summary information the packet capturing module 
continues to gather network information for the next case. 
3.7.3 Storage of the Captured Data 
Every packet has headers that contain important information necessary for 
transmission through a network medium. The headers identify a packets source 
address, destination address, source port, destination port, and destination protocol. It 
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also contains other information that is necessary for routing the packets over 
networks and the Internet. 
Once collected the network data that the packet capturing module gathers is stored in 
a database. This information is stored in the database in two parts, the important 
packet information and the case data created from the network data. 
In addition to the storage of packet information in the database every single packet 
and most of the header information is stored in a separate text file. This is so that the 
expert can get an extremely detailed analysis of the traffic (see 7.2 Appendix B: 
Detailed Packet Analysis).  
3.7.3.1 Packet Information Storage 
When a packet is detected by the packet capturing module some key characteristics 
of the packet are recorded in a database. 
Column Name Description 
IP Source Address 
 
This identifies the system that sent the packet. This 
address is not unique to each machine and this address is 
easily ‘spoofed’. Spoofing is where a machine sends 
packets with a source address that is not their own in an 
attempt to fool the recipient that this sender is a trusted 
system. 
Source Port The source port identifies the protocol or application that 
created the packet on the source machine. 
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IP Destination Address  
 
This identifies the recipient system of the packet. In the 
normal processes of a TCP/IP network only the system 
identified by the destination address will process and 
extract the information from this packet. There are 
exceptions to this rule for example systems called proxies 
will extract information from all packets in order to make 
filtering decisions for network traffic. 
Typically the destination address will identify a single 
host however there are a category of destination 
addresses called broadcast addresses. These broadcast 
addresses are used to send a single packet that all hosts 
within a network or sub-network will process. If these 
broadcast addresses didn’t exist then a host wanting to 
send packets to all hosts, within a network or sub-
network, would have to send a packet address 
specifically to each recipient host. 
Destination Port 
 
The destination port is used by the recipient machine to 
identify the protocol or application that the packet should 
be processed by. 
Table 3-1: IP Database Table 
 
Column Name Description 
Parameter This is used to identify the name of the condition that 
is being stored for the case  
Expression This is used to store the expression sign of the 
condition  
Value This is used to store the actual value of the condition 
Table 3-2: Case Database Table 
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3.8 Not All Users are Security Experts 
In attempting to situate this system in a real environment a number of issues become 
obvious: The system is only as good as the security knowledge of the user. If the user 
is not a security expert then it makes it difficult for the user to identify the patterns 
for various attacks. As well as the user will have other work to complete rather than 
interface with an expert system. This being the case a feature that allows the 
administrator to dynamically import acquired knowledge, rules and situational data, 
had been created within the monitoring system. 
An expert will typically not want the system to keep asking for prompting for rules 
that should be automated. This is easily rectified by the addition a simple checkbox 
for automating a rule that has been deemed definitely correct. The rule will still be 
used in further MCRDR validations otherwise the knowledge base could become 
invalid. This process will allow for easy integration with the action modules that is 
discussed in future work. The action modules would not prompt the expert to carry 
out their assigned tasks rather it would be automated. 
 
3.9 Existence of Generalised Threat Patterns 
The unknown threat detection system works by observing the network activity 
exhibited on the monitored host. This limitation allows the system to be developed 
within the time allocated to an honours project. However this limitation means that 
patterns must exist for the various threats at the network level for the monitoring 
system to perform successfully at the intended goals. To test the overall goals of the 
distributed security monitoring system it was found through the experiments and 
results, detailed later, that generalised threat patterns do exist at the network level. 
 
3.10 Evaluation of Experiments 
To determine that an unknown threat detection system is operationally effective the 
system setup to be monitoring on a victim machine while it was bombarded with the 
various threats. Meanwhile the expert interfaced with the system in order to classify 
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the threats as they occurred. The threats used in the experimentation are not 
unknown; they have been identified and are well documented in literature. However 
in order to test a system that identifies unknown threats it would be impossible to 
have an unknown threat attack situation. The only possible way would be to attach a 
monitored host to the Internet and hope that it looks inviting enough for an attacker 
to attack it in the first place and secondly that he/she will use a previously unknown 
attack in which to do so. As can be reasoned this may take a long time, if at all. The 
assumption used for testing is that at some point in computing history the attacks 
were not known and had to be identified through some means. So testing of the 
system was carried out by identifying candidate threats and creating or downloading 
the source code for an attack. Meanwhile the expert will identify the patterns and 
subsequent conditions that best represent and identify the attack from the norm. 
The candidate threats were selected from a varying mix of complexity and what type 
of systems the threat would typically attack, such as mainly server oriented. The 
threats that were used in the experiments are detailed below. 
3.10.1 Denial of Service 
Denial of Service is where an attacker will abuse a publicly accessible service to the 
point where legitimate service activity can no longer occur (see 2.4.2 Denial of 
Servce). Two different forms of this threat were selected for testing. First a basic 
denial of service attack, ping flooding, which can affect both normal type hosts and 
servers was selected. Next a server oriented denial of service attack that is directed at 
E-Mail servers, mail bombing, was selected. 
3.10.1.1 ICMP DoS – Ping Flooding 
The terms ‘ping’ and ‘pinging’ refers to a system sending a test packet to another 
host to see whether it has connectivity to that host. Normally the sending host will 
send out four small Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) packets to the target 
host. When the target host receives these packets it will reply back using the same 
ICMP protocol. Normally this type of operation is legitimate and is even the basis for 
some of the older monitoring systems that would poll hosts to ensure network-wide 
connectivity. However there are software utilities and built-in ping functionality 
within operating systems that allow a host to flood out a significant amount of ICMP 
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packets to a destination or range of destinations. The destination host/s will have to 
process each packet and send a reply back to each packet as part of the design of the 
ping protocol. This significantly reduces the amount of normal network traffic that 
the victim host can process. The denial of service effect can be exponentially 
increased by increasing the number of flooding hosts to a point where the pipeline to 
the victim host becomes completely saturated and no normal network activity can be 
achieved. 
The testing of such a denial of service attack was done using multiple hosts using 
ping flooding software called UtilityPing that is freely available from the Internet. 
Running a denial of service experiment on a live network will degrade the network’s 
performance. So to reduce the likelihood of performance degradation on the 
University network, and to not give the Information Services staff a headache, the 
attacking hosts only flooded in short bursts. 
3.10.1.2 Server DoS - E-Mail Bombing 
There are many different versions of the sendmail protocol that exist for e-mail 
delivery over the Internet. The basic principle to sendmail is that no e-mail should 
ever be lost. The developers of sendmail made the protocol extremely robust in order 
to cater for the lossless principle. This factor makes it extremely difficult to defend 
against e-mail denial of service attacks. This form of attack has been dubbed e-mail 
bombs or e-mail bombing. The primary objective of e-mail bombs is to flood the e-
mail server so that it becomes unavailable or unserviceable. The secondary 
objectives from the e-mail bomb are to degrade the availability of communication 
systems, undermine the integrity of organisations, or distribute illicit material (Bass 
et al. 1998). 
During the first half of 1997, Langley Air Force Base came under repeated e-mail 
bombing attacks via the Internet. The mail system administrators, unaware that they 
were coming under attack with an e-mail bomb, simply rebooted the servers when 
they stopped responding (Bass et al. 1998). 
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Figure 3-6: Langley AFB 1997 Mail Activity (Bass et al. 1998) 
In the above figure the total amount of mail over the period is shown by the light line 
while the dark line indicates the mail due to the e-mail bomb. 
To test this form of denial of service attack an e-mail server was setup to be a victim 
while another host repeatedly bombed the victim server. The e-mail bomb used for 
testing was a simple PHP script that was run on a web server (see Appendix). This 
test is to check that the monitoring system can be used for various, differing host 
roles; in this test it was an e-mail server.  
3.10.2 Information Gathering 
Information gathering is where the attacker, whether it is a Worm or a human, probes 
the target machine/s to determine important information about the victim. The 
gathered information includes: operating system type and version, protocols and 
services in use and open ports to exploit. This process dubbed “fingerprinting” 
shortcuts the time it takes the attacker to compromise the machine. With an 
awareness of the configuration of the target the attacker will know exactly which 
vulnerability to exploit. 
The following experiments investigate some of the techniques used in the 
fingerprinting process; namely various port scanning techniques. Port scanning 
describes the process of identifying open ports that exist on the open machine. These 
ports are typically reserved for certain protocols and services and once identified can 
be exploited. Within TCP/IP network there are typically two protocols used for 
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transporting data; Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP).  
3.10.2.1 UDP Port Scan 
UDP communication is connection-less so no handshaking procedure is required. 
The UDP port scan experiment was conducted using freely available port scanning 
software called SuperScan 4. In this application it was possible to isolate the protocol 
and ranges of ports to scan. The experiment involved using a target victim machine 
connected to an attacker who would scan the UDP ports of the victim with the 
default ‘vulnerable’ port ranges within SuperScan 4. The expert interfaced with the 
monitoring system on the victim machine to create logics identifying the attack 
pattern. 
3.10.2.2 TCP Port Scan 
TCP communication is achieved through establishing a logical connection between 
sender and recipient. The logical communications channel is established through a 
handshaking procedure (described in 2.1.2 Connection-Oriented and Connection-
Less). When the handshake has been successfully completed normal data 
communications can commence. The software used in this experiment was once 
again SuperScan 4. The application was set to scan the TCP ports that were open on 
the victim machine. The expert interacted with the interface of the monitoring system 
on the victim machine to create the logics that identified the attack pattern. 
3.10.3 Worm Attack 
Worms are a form of virus that can propagate using their own means (described in 
2.3.4 Worms). A Worm will scan for active vulnerable machines and then mobilise 
to infect it.  
In this experiment a worm simulation was created and used by a monitored host to 
attack another monitored machine. The worm simulation provided was not identified 
ahead of time and the expert had to identify discriminating patterns from analysis. 
The worm displayed curious properties that are detailed in the results section. 
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3.10.4 Base-lining 
In order to gain a perspective of the activity on a network an analyst will observe the 
traffic flows during normal usage periods. This establishes a base-line for the 
network from which any exceptional behaviour can be identified.  
A static analysis of an individual point on the network will not divulge behaviours 
over a subnet and so will not be comprehensive enough to apply the patterns as 
general trends for the entire network. Therefore an analyst will observe multiple 
areas of the network to create a profile of its behaviour. The areas that the analyst 
samples data from will depend on the scope and perspective of the network 
monitoring (Shimeall, Dunlevy & Pesante 2001).  
Once the initial base-lining and analysis has been done, a network analyst can use 
this information to identify anomalous activity that could have been otherwise 
masked by normal traffic. 
In this experiment the expert observed and created logics for the normal activity 
flows and network chatter that appeared on a host during normal operation. The aim 
was to create logics that would identify normal traffic conditions. If the host is base-
lined then there are logics that will clearly distinguish between normal and 
anomalous activities. 
 
 
 
Distributed Security Monitoring for Unknown Threats Results  
 - 57 -  
4 Results 
The experiments using the developed system have produced some interesting results. 
These results are discussed in the following sections. 
4.1 Denial of ServiceAttack Type 
As described previously in the background (2.3.2 Denial of Service) the denial of 
service class of attacks attempt to disrupt system and network activity by overloading 
a publicly accessible service. The following is the generalised pattern discovered for 
a ping flooding attack. This shows the activity exhibit on the victim host. 
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Figure 4-1: Ping Flood Victim’s Activity 
 
As can be seen from the above figure the testing started with a small amount of 
pinging. At around case eight multiple machines began flooding the victim and the 
ICMP activity spikes. At various points with the experiment multiple machines 
flooded the victim which presented itself as large ICMP spikes. In the normal form 
of the ping flooding attack the ICMP activity would peak to maximum and then flat-
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line for the period of time the attack occurs. However, as mentioned previously, the 
flooding was limited to reduce live network degradation. 
The case condition that is selected to identify the attack is Incoming_ICMP. Figure 
4-2 is the rule tree that was created by the expert in the process of monitoring this 
threat 
 
Figure 4-2: Rule Tree created in the Ping DoS experiment. To save space only the core rules are 
displayed 
From the observations of Figure 4-2 it can be seen how the rule tree in the 
monitoring system using MCRDR can be easily refined and expanded upon. Each of 
the first layer rules (children of the root) is a separate branch of reasoning (or line of 
inquiry). Each of the first layer rules will be checked to see whether the conditions 
are satisfied and if so that branch is further investigated. Figure 4-2 demonstrates 
how a stop rule within the monitoring system works. For instance the rule with 
condition “Incoming ICMP < 15” has conclusion Normal, that is unless the “Packet 
= 0” is not met which will then create a NULL (non-text) conclusion. This flexibility 
allows the expert to stop certain rules firing when the expert realises the conclusions 
under certain conditions. 
To test that the expert monitoring system can be used to monitor different types of 
hosts, name a server type, a different more selective threat was used in the next 
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experiment. The attack that was used in the next experiment is a technique called E-
Mail bombing.  
The objective of an e-mail bomb is to overload an e-mail server so that it becomes 
unavailable or is unserviceable. Repeated e-mail bombing will degrade the quality of 
service of the organisational communications infrastructure. This is due to the fact 
that the numerous bombed e-mails need to be processed and tends to overflow the 
mail spool (mail storage directory) (Bass et al. 1998). The ramifications are that the 
organisation will have difficulty in electronic communication with partners and 
consumers.  
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Figure 4-3: SMTP Pattern during E-mail Bombing 
The activity shown in Figure 4-3 demonstrates how the port 25, or Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP), rates peak at the points where the e-mail server is being 
bombed. Normal e-mail activity is clearly distinguished by the much smaller peaks. 
From this graph it is clear that a generalised pattern on port 25 does exist for e-mail 
bombing. The main problem with identifying this threat is at level is should the 
threshold be set. The expert will need to ascertain the levels of e-mail traffic that the 
organisation receives over various time periods, such as over the weekend. The 
expert identifies the peaks of the normal e-mail activities and at what times these 
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peaks occur. Then the expert can include time information as well as the port 25 
activity in order to determine threshold levels for identifying e-mail bombing.  In 
addition if the threshold levels are set too low or high they can be dynamically 
adjusted later on by the expert using the interface, and hence the underlying MCRDR 
processes. An interesting item to note is the comparison of this graph to the graph of 
the e-mail attack at Langley AFB (see Figure 3-6: Langley AFB 1997 Mail Activity 
(Bass et al. 1998)). Although the scale is significantly different and the activity show 
in the Langley AFB figure goes off actual e-mails rather than incoming port 25 
activity, the similarities are noteworthy. 
The case condition that is selected to identify this attack is Incoming_Port_25 (see 
7.1 Appendix A: The Case Conditions). The following diagram is the rule tree that 
was created by the expert in the process of monitoring this threat 
 
Figure 4-4: Rule Tree created in the E-Mail DoS experiment. To save space only the core rules 
are displayed 
To create the rule to protect against this threat the expert simply selects the 
Incoming_Port_25 condition and edits its value to reflect the threshold margin that 
will indicate the threat. If the initial rules within the system have incorrect thresholds 
then the flexibility of the implementation will allow dynamic refinement.  
Another condition that can be factored into better identifying the e-mail bombing 
threat is the Time condition (see 7.1 Appendix A: The Case Conditions). The Time 
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condition can be used to develop logics based around the peak user e-mail periods in 
combination with setting a generalised conditional threshold. Using Time as a rule 
condition allows the expert to create better and more flexible logics for threat 
identification. 
4.2 Information Gathering Threat 
Before an attacker launches an attack he/she will attempt to determine that a target 
host is active, determine which operating system is being used, and the open ports. 
This information gathering process has been dubbed fingerprinting. The information 
that the attacker gathers from this process allows him/her to make a determination of 
the available vulnerabilities to exploit. An attacker can launch attacks upon the target 
without determining this predetermined information but this takes a significant 
amount of time. In addition if the target host has any sort of monitoring installed then 
it is highly likely that these failed attacks will trip an alarm so that the target gets 
locked down or isolated. Figure 4-5 shows experimental results from the port 
scanning threat. The two different types of scanning that are used within the 
experiments are UDP and TCP port scans. The two protocol scanning techniques are 
tested separately due to the differing behaviours of each technique. UDP and TCP 
port scanning will differ because of the connection-less and connection-oriented 
nature of the protocols (see 2.1.2 Connection-Oriented and Connection-Less). 
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Figure 4-5: UDP Port Scan significant conditions 
Figure 4-5 shows the conditions that were significantly affected after a UDP port 
scan on the monitored victim machine. Each of the conditions within the graph 
peaked whenever a UDP scan was targeted at the victim. The 
Number_Different_IN_Port_Hits indicates the number of different incoming ports 
that were hit on the monitored victim. Values of around eighty different ports in 
twenty seconds are abnormally high for a host undertaking normal tasks. In order for 
UDP port scanning identification to be less generalised, to reduce the possibility of 
false alarms, it is desirable to have multiple conditional thresholds to work from. 
Outgoing_ICMP is another condition that was significantly affected during the UDP 
scanning process. However, it is desirable for ICMP type conditions to be reserved 
for use in identifying the ping flooding threat. This is because pinging uses the ICMP 
protocol. Another noteworthy condition was the number of source route packets 
created during the UDP scanning process. Source routing within packets is typically 
used by routers for testing and congestion management (see 7.1 Appendix A: The 
Case Conditions for a further description). Within any organisational network it is 
quite uncommon to find packets with the source routing option set. This is a good 
condition to use as part of the logics for UDP scan identification. Further analysis of 
the results produced another viable condition. 
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Figure 4-6: Most Hit Outgoing UDP Port   
Note that a value of 0 actually means no activity during the case time rather than Port 0 being 
the most hit port 
Figure 4-6 shows the outgoing UDP port that was hit the most during each of the 
cases. If this graph and the previous graph are compared then a direct relation can be 
drawn; during the periods where the previous conditions, such as Source Route 
packets, are spiking the most hit out port is 771. There is a direct one-to-one 
relationship between the conditional spikes and port 771 being the most hit out port. 
After multiple experiments on different systems, using different operating systems 
(Mandrake) and different scanning utilities (NMap) this relationship remained. From 
this it has determined that the best way to identify this threat is to use the 
Outgoing_Port_771 condition (see 7.1 Appendix A: The Case Conditions) in 
addition to a combination of the previous conditions mentioned above. 
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Figure 4-7: Rule Tree created in the UDP scanning experiment 
To save space only the core rules are displayed 
Figure 4-7 shows how each of the conditions occupies its own branch within the rule 
tree. Each of the conditional logics is compared on each pass of the reasoning 
process. This flexibility allows extra rules with differing condition logics to be easily 
incorporated within the rule tree.  
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With TCP port scanning the behaviour is different due to the three-way handshake 
process undertaken before a TCP communication session are established.  
TCP Port Scan
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Figure 4-8: TCP Port Scan significant conditions 
As can be observed, the key conditions spike dramatically when a TCP port scan 
occurs on the victim machine.  The first condition that could be used identification 
purposes is the number of different incoming ports hit. This, like UDP before it, is 
quite a significant condition as the number of active protocols and services during 
routine operation will typically be low. The most significant condition that is used to 
identify TCP port scanning is obviously the Reset_Connections condition. Where 
each of the activity spikes occur the Reset_Connections condition has a major 
upsurge. Reset connections within the TCP protocol occur as a result of a protocol 
violation in the handshake procedure (see 2.1.2 Connection-Oriented and 
Connection-Less and 7.1 Appendix A: The Case Conditions). The TCP port scan 
software will send a specially crafted TCP packet that will get the target machine to 
respond if it happens to hit an open TCP port. Any closed ports will respond to this 
crafted packet with a protocol violation and reset the attempted connection. TCP 
protocol violations happen very rarely on any network so this condition becomes the 
chief identifier for the TCP port scanning threat. One interesting point to note from 
the above graph is the TCP Sessions Started condition. It indicates how many of the 
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TCP port connections that the target machine responded to; telling the attacker which 
of the TCP ports is open on the victim. 
 
Figure 4-9: Rule Tree created in the TCP scanning experiment 
To save space only the core rules are displayed 
The rule tree within Figure 4-9 shows that in circumstances where there are only a 
few conditions needed to identify an attack the resulting rule tree created is minimal. 
Even though the rule tree is minimal, provided the thresholds have been set correctly, 
it is very efficient and effective at identifying the attack,  
4.3 Worm Threat 
The Worm threat describes the actions of a Worm in its attempts to mobilise and 
attack vulnerable hosts (see 2.3.4 Worms). In this experiment a worm simulation was 
used to attack another machine while the expert interfaced with the monitoring 
system and attempted to discover identifying patterns. 
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Figure 4-10: The Worm Attack Behaviour 
Figure 4-10 shows the activity levels of various conditions observed during the 
Worm attack experiment. From the above graph the conditions do not show any 
obvious conditions that are suitable for identifying the Worm. The conditions are 
typical traffic patterns that are reasonable for any network. The only behaviour that is 
consistent is that the traffic tends to be constantly increasing. These conditions alone 
are not enough to conclusive identify the Worm. The activities in Figure 4-10 could 
be attributed to normal traffic operations on the monitored host. This is activity 
normality shows some of the complex behaviours exhibited by a Worm; self-
preservation by attempting to obfuscate its activities as normal network traffic 
patterns. The longer a Worm can disguise its activities as benign, the better its 
chances of infecting more machines.  
For the expert to be able to identify the Worm threat there needs to be a more 
definitive condition. Using the above conditions would create a large number of false 
alarms, no matter what threshold is set for the conditions. It is highly likely that these 
types of patterns would exist in normal network usage. Some other condition/s 
needed to be found which will identify the Worm threat. 
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Figure 4-11: The Most Hit Incoming Ports by an Attacking Worm 
Figure 4-11 shows that there exists a clear trend in the ports that the attacking Worm 
is attempting to exploit. The greatest incoming port typically hit is port 137 and port 
138. These ports are used by the NetBIOS datagram service (Mueller 2002), for 
connectionless broadcast services to applications. This type of traffic is quite normal 
as applications such as the Messenger service use this port for communication. 
However the amount of traffic produced on these ports by the Worm is telling. 
 
Figure 4-12: Rule Tree created in the Worm experiment 
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To save space only the core rules are displayed 
The rule tree contained in Figure 4-12 demonstrates how the expert identifies a well 
disguised threat. First of all the expert will identify the conditions that show 
normality within the host by using very abstract and general rules. As soon as the 
expert realises that one of the normal rules concluded incorrectly, a refinement rule 
that adjusts the conclusion is added to the incorrect rule. This can be seen in Figure 
4-12 where a rule with conditions “Most_Hit_IN_Port = 137” wrongly concluded 
Normal and is refined to conclude attack when the condition “Incoming_Port_137 > 
50” is satisfied. 
4.4 Base-lining 
Base-lining is the process of identifying the normal traffic flows that occur on a host 
or network. This experiment was conducted on a host conducting normal activities 
while connected to the University network. 
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Figure 4-13: Observations of normal host activity 
As can be observed from Figure 4-13 the network activities were typically minimal. 
There are periods, like around case thirty, when the traffic spikes. These spikes are 
attributed to network based services communicating their availability. The services 
that are in operation during this base-lining experiment are: an e-mail client, mapped 
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network drives within Windows Explorer, and network wide anti-virus software. At 
various points in time each of these services has polled or accessed the appropriate 
server, which is indicated by the spikes in traffic. The large spike in the traffic is due 
to all services accessing or advertising to their respective servers at the same time. 
From this graph it can be seen that the conditions typically have minimal values. The 
expert will select low type thresholds for each of the above conditions to identify 
normal traffic. Each of the spikes can be classified as normal using other conditions 
that clearly identify which service is creating the spike, for example an e-mail  based 
spike can be classified with a separate e-mail logic branch in the rule tree using a 
POP3 (Post Office Protocol version 3) condition. If the above conditions are used for 
identifying the spiking traffic as normal then there will be a number of false positives 
as these conditions are quite generalised. In addition to this if the generalised 
conditions are used to identify spiking normal traffic then at what level are the 
thresholds going to be set that will cover legitimate significant traffic situations, such 
as copying a large file across the network? 
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Figure 4-14: The most hit incoming/outgoing ports within any given case 
In this graph port values of 0 do not indicate port 0 was the most hit port; rather it indicates 
that there was no port activity during this case. 
Figure 4-14 shows the most hit incoming and outgoing ports during the base-lining 
experiment. The most hit outgoing port tends to cluster around port 1346 which is 
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registered as providing a licensing service. The most hit incoming port clusters 
around ports 137 and 138 which have been mentioned previously as being used for 
NetBIOS datagram service. These port values and the NetBIOS datagram service 
have been previously mentioned as being a main identifying condition within the 
Worm attack experiment. This is a clear indication of the Worm was trying to hide 
its actions in amongst normal traffic activity. The question that is raised from this is 
that will the system produce enormous amounts of false alarms trying to identify 
Worm activity? The answer to this question is that it will require some effort to 
ensure the threshold level set for the Incoming_Port_138 condition is high enough so 
that normal traffic is not identified and low enough to ensure Worm activity is 
detected. However this is not a significant issue as even if the thresholds are 
originally set incorrectly the monitoring system allows dynamic adjustment of these 
threshold values.  
 
Figure 4-15: Rule Tree created in the Base-Lining experiment 
To save space only the core rules are displayed 
The expert will determine the conditions that identify the normal activity on the 
organisational network and edit their threshold values appropriately. If the Worm 
attack data (see Figure 4-10: The Worm Attack Behaviour) and the base-lining data 
(see Figure 4-13: Observations of normal host activity) is looked at individually they 
each have clear, distinct patterns. However when combined together into a single 
graph it immediately becomes apparent that the Worm activity dominates the graph 
and hence identifiable.  
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Figure 4-16: Combined Base-Line and Worm Attack Data 
After the completion and analysis of the experiments it was discovered that there are 
two types of generalised threat patterns existed that could be used to group these 
patterns: peak patterns and incremental patterns. The peak patterns are the threats 
that exhibit spikes in the condition/s when the attack occurs on the host, such as the 
E-mail Bomb pattern. Whereas the incremental patterns are the threat patterns that 
have a generalised increasing trend within the condition/s when it strikes, such as the 
Worm attack. Further analysis of results will use these two generalised patterns types 
rather than investigate every individual attack. 
 
4.5 Speed of rule addition 
The monitoring system captures the network data in real-time and buffers the cases 
in a database so that the expert can concentrate on the case that he/she is analysing. 
What typically occurs is the expert will fall behind the current cases being collected. 
However when the monitoring system concludes correctly on a case, and the expert 
has confirmed this, then the expert will catch up to the current traffic analysis data. 
So the more correct conclusions the system produces, the closer the expert will be to 
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approaching the currently captured data. The following sections illustrate the time it 
took the expert to create rules, in the peak threat and the incremental threat pattern 
types. 
4.5.1 Peak Threat Patterns 
The peak threat patterns are easier to discover and classify as these patterns contain 
conditions that exhibit obvious activity spikes when the host is under attack. The 
expert simply observes the spiking condition/s and creates rules based on these 
conditions. Figure 4-17 shows the times taken to add rules in the Ping Flood 
experiment. 
Time Taken for Case Rule Creation
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Rule
Ti
m
e
 
(S
ec
o
n
ds
)
Creation Time
Average Time: 141.33
 
Figure 4-17: Rule Creation Time in the Ping Flood Experiment 
As can be observed the time taken to add rules to identify this Denial of Service 
attack averaged around 2 minutes 30 seconds.  
4.5.2 Incremental Threat Pattern 
The incremental threat patterns are more difficult to create rules for due to the more 
intensive analysis required by the expert to identify the pattern. The in-depth analysis 
is required because the expert wanting to ensure that correct conditions are being 
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selected to identify the threat to reduce false positives. Also, due to the condition 
patterns being more difficult to identify, the expert will usually create more abstract 
rules. As more rules are created the average number of cornerstone cases from which 
to validate against increase. This has the effect of lengthening the 
validation/revalidation cycle. Figure 4-18 shows the times taken to add rules in the 
Worm experiment. 
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Figure 4-18: Rule Creation Time in the Worm Experiment 
As can be observed from the results the average time to add a rule in the Worm 
experiment was around 3 minutes 15 seconds. Also there exists a slight trend for the 
rule creation time to increase as the number of rules in the system increased and 
hence the number of cornerstone cases that need to be validated against also 
increased. 
Overall rule addition within the distributed monitoring system averaged around three 
minutes. The majority of this time was used by the expert to ensure analysis all of 
relevant data so that no threat patterns were left undiscovered and normal traffic 
conditions misclassified. The process of rule addition within the monitoring system 
is trivial and the time taken for rule creation is comparable to other existing systems. 
Observations of experts maintaining the GARVIN ES1 system showed that the time 
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taken to add rules for each case, whether refinements of previous rules or completely 
new classifications, averaged around ten per hour (Compton & Jansen 1989).  
4.6 Accuracy of Threat Detection 
The accuracy of the monitoring system in threat detection is a true measure of the 
performance and capabilities of such a system. If the monitoring system was 
inaccurate in identifying threats then the usability of such a system rapidly 
diminishes. The accuracy of threat detection in the system is dependent on the expert 
being able to establish the logics that will identify the threat now and in the future. 
The expert does not necessary have to know about every single threat, known and 
unknown, rather he/she has to apply an understanding of the situation aspects that 
will identify the threat symptoms. 
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Figure 4-19: Detection Accuracy for the Ping Flooding Experiment 
Figure 4-19 shows the accuracy of the monitoring system in identifying a Peak 
Threat Pattern; ping flooding. The results show that at first the monitoring system 
cannot identify the threat at all. This is due to there being no logics and situational 
data to identify the threat. However, as the expert begins adding the logics and 
knowledge for threat identification the accuracy of the monitoring system improves 
dramatically. This improvement progresses to a point where the monitoring system is 
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identifying the threat around 90% of the time. A similar scenario occurs for the threat 
detection accuracy for the incremental threat patterns. 
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Figure 4-20: Detection Accuracy for the Worm Experiment 
Figure 4-20 shows that, although it takes longer to achieve consistent accuracy above 
50% due to the expert creating more abstract logics, the monitoring system 
eventually reaches 91% accuracy in identifying the Worm threat. Results of this 
nature show that, even though it may take the expert some time to develop the 
correct logics for identifying any threat, in the long term the monitoring system will 
be able to adapt and identify any threat with a minimum of false alarms. 
The results from the experimentation show that generalised threat patterns at the 
network level of a host system do exist. The results also indicate that the monitoring 
system is flexible and can dynamically adapt its logics and thresholds to identify 
threats on the individual hosts. In addition to these factors the monitoring system 
reduces the burden upon an expert in the task of creating and refining the rules within 
the system, to a point where adding rules becomes a trivial task that can be achieved 
in a minimal amount of time. The monitoring system also achieves these features and 
functions while still maintaining threat detection accuracy and keeping false alarms 
to a minimum. 
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5 Conclusions and Future Work 
The research in this study focussed on the production of a distributed monitoring 
system for use in the detection of unknown threats. The monitoring system 
developed is driven by logics which allow the expert to correctly identify network 
threat patterns as they manifest on a host. The logics that are developed over time 
will give the expert a clear understanding of the way in which the unknown threats 
behave on the various hosts. The addition of these logics within the system is 
dynamic and flexible; allowing the expert to create generalised rules that can be 
further refined or a series of quite specific threat defining rules. It can be seen that 
the flexible logics allow the monitoring system to adapt to the dynamic environment 
that exists within networks. The flexibility also allows the monitoring system to be 
tailored to the specific behaviours and operations of each individual monitored host.   
The dynamic and flexible rule structure is only one half of the unknown threat 
detection equation; reducing the time it takes to create the rules, and hence respond 
to the threats is the other. The results show that the addition of rules and situational 
knowledge within the monitoring system is a trivial task for the expert. This gives the 
expert more time to extract, adapt and apply the knowledge throughout the monitored 
network. This reduces the response time to the previously unknown threat on the 
monitored network. 
Having an effective response to an unknown threat requires that the system that alerts 
the expert must be accurate. The experimentation results show that the accuracy of 
the monitoring system, after the addition of some of the threat defining logics, is 
high. The accuracy of the system is always improving as the system is run and the 
logics are refined. This accuracy will keep the number of false positives (false 
alarms) to a minimum so that the expert is not conditioned into ignoring the system 
alerts. 
Finally it can be concluded that the attainment of the previous aims has proven that 
the use of MCRDR within the network security domain was successfully applied and 
is valid within this domain.  
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Although the system has been proven to achieve its intended goals does not mean 
that it cannot be improved. The following is a discussion on the possible future 
extensions that will enhance the system.  
Currently the system operates passively; it simply assists an expert to identify and 
create protection logics for possible threats. However the expert, to further enhance 
the protection aspect of the monitoring system, requires are a set of modules that can 
respond to the newly identified threats. If a plug-in action module interface were 
created then this will allow the creation of response modules that carry out specific 
tasks. The plug-in interface will allow new threats to be countered with new action 
modules that are created by the expert. 
If a proxy module was created and incorporated within the monitoring system, then it 
would allow the rebuilding of packet streams to identify the application commands 
that were being executed on the host. This would allow the possible creation of more, 
all encompassing logics that identify an unknown threat. For example a FTP stream 
could be rebuilt and any commands that should not be executed on the server would 
be identified in real-time. 
Finally a server system could be created that interacted and observed each of the 
monitoring modules on the hosts. This server would have a more abstracted view of 
the behaviours being exhibited on the network and be able to take actions based on 
networks and sub-networks rather than individual hosts. Tying the server system in 
with the distributed monitoring system will mean greater security coverage for the 
network.
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Appendix A: The Case Conditions 
The following table shows all the conditions used within the system and the 
description of what each represents. 
Condition Name Description 
Packet This condition identifies the number of packets that were 
received in the case time. The packets counted include 
packets not specifically addressed to this host but still 
received by the network card. This traffic is typically 
network ‘chatter’; that is traffic sent by routers and other 
network devices for specific protocol purposes. 
Time This condition is the time when the case is created. This 
is so that time can be used as a condition for a conclusion 
Sessions Started This condition indicates the number of TCP sessions that 
were started within the case time period. The variable that 
counts the sessions started is incremented after every 
successful TCP session no matter whether they are 
eventually terminated or not. 
Reset Connect This condition indicates the number of reset TCP 
connections within the case time period. A TCP session is 
reset when the host detects that there has been a TCP 
protocol violation. 
Active Sessions This condition indicates the number of TCP sessions that 
are currently active on the monitored host at the end of 
the case time. 
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Source Route Packets Source route packets are those packets that have been told 
which route to follow in order to reach its intended 
destination. This is used by routers for congestion 
management and by network experts for experimentation. 
This feature however is typically not used and seen by the 
host and can be used as a sign that suspicious activity is 
occurring on the monitored host. When this operation is 
in effect on a packet flags are set which the system can 
detect. This condition indicates the number of these 
packets that were sent and received in the case time 
period. 
Most Hit IN Port This condition shows the inbound port, UDP or TCP, that 
has received the most hits. In order to determine whether 
the packet was destined for an inbound port on the 
monitored host the packet’s destination address is 
compared to this host’s source IP address for a match. In 
addition to this if the packet’s destination address is a 
directed broadcast to this host’s subnet then this will 
increment this condition as well 
Most Hit OUT Port This condition shows the outbound port, UDP or TCP, 
that has received the most hits. In order to determine 
whether the packet originated from this host the packet’s 
source address is compared to the host’s IP address for a 
match. 
Num Diff Ports IN This condition shows the number of different inbound 
ports that were hit within the case time. The packet is 
checked to see whether it was destined for this host to 
ensure that network chatter is not included in this 
conditions, which would throw off the readings 
Num Diff Ports OUT This condition shows the number of different outbound 
ports that were hit within the case time. The packet is 
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checked to see whether it originated from this host to 
ensure that network chatter is not included in this 
conditions, which would throw off the readings 
Incoming TCP This condition shows the amount of inbound TCP or 
connection oriented activity that took place within the 
case time period. The system checks to ensure that the 
packet was destined for this host via direct or broadcast 
addressing. 
Outgoing TCP This condition shows the amount of outgoing TCP or 
connection oriented activity that took place within the 
case time period. 
Incoming UDP This condition shows the amount of incoming UDP or 
connection-less activity that took place within the case 
time period. The system checks to ensure that the packet 
was destined for this host whether it be through direct or 
broadcast addressing. 
Outgoing UDP This condition shows the amount of outgoing UDP or 
connection-less activity that took place within the case 
time period. The system checks to confirm that the 
originator of this packet was this host. Otherwise network 
chatter will be included which will throw out the accuracy 
of this condition 
Incoming Port 25 This condition is used to see how much of the packet 
activity was due to incoming E-mails. Port 25 is used for 
receiving E-mail while typically port 110 (Post Office 
Protocol 3 port) is used to check and download E-mail. 
This condition will be very active on a host that acts as an 
E-Mail server. 
Outgoing Port 25 This condition is used to indicate how much of the 
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network activity was due to the sending of E-mails 
Incoming Port 771 This condition indicates the amount of activity due to 
incoming port 771 packets. The port that is used to 
respond to refused UDP communications. 
Outgoing Port 771 This condition indicates the amount of activity due to 
responses for refused UDP communications. 
Incoming Port 68 This condition indicates the amount of traffic destined for 
this host on port 68 
Incoming Port 21 This condition indicates the amount of FTP traffic that is 
inbound to this host. Typically this host will have FTP 
server functionality for this condition to increment 
Outgoing Port 21 This condition indicates the amount of outgoing FTP 
traffic from the monitored host. The host will request FTP 
data from a server which will have a source of port 21. 
Incoming Port 138 This condition indicates the amount of traffic destined for 
the NetBIOS datagram service. This port is used for 
applications such as messenger services. 
Incoming Port 137 This condition indicates the amount of traffic destined for 
the NetBIOS datagram service. This port is used for 
applications such as messenger services. 
Proxied Incoming HTTP Due to the configuration of the University network all 
incoming HTTP traffic will come from the proxy server 
on port 8080. This condition monitors this as well as any 
internal University network HTTP traffic destined for this 
host. 
Outgoing HTTP This condition logs the number of HTTP requests that the 
monitored host issues. 
  Appendices  
 - 87 -  
Incoming ICMP When another machine pings this monitored host this 
condition will increment to show this activity. In addition 
to this other incoming ICMP traffic (such as Destination 
Unreachable packets)will be logged by this condition.  
Outgoing ICMP When the monitored host sends out ICMP data, such as a 
ping, it will be detected and logged by this condition. 
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol allows hosts to 
participate in multicasting groups. Multicast groups are 
identified by a single address. IGMP allows a router to 
determine which hosts are within which groups on a 
given network segment. This condition monitors all 
IGMP traffic. 
PIM Count PIM or Protocol Independent Multicast is multicasting 
technique that is not tied to any routing protocol. This 
condition logs the traffic that uses this protocol. 
Table 7-1: The Case Conditions used in the Monitoring System 
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7.2 Appendix B: Detailed Packet Analysis 
The following is all of the logged header information for a single packet. The packet 
header information is all saved for further detailed analysis by the expert if required. 
Each packet header and its values are written to a text file separate from the 
monitoring system. 
For reference the following are the header structures contained within a packet. 
 
Figure 7-1: The IP Header and its various fields (Chappell 2001) 
 
 
Figure 7-2: The TCP Header and its various fields (Chappell 2001) 
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Figure 7-3: The UDP Header and its various fields (Chappell 2001) 
 
The following is an IP packet extracted from the detailed log file. This packet is 
using the UDP protocol for transmission. The IP addresses have been altered for 
confidentiality reasons. 
IP HEADER:  
01:41:45,377929 len:285 XXX.XXX.36.238:1346 -> XXX.XXX.34.25:1347  
Version: 4 
Internet Header Length: 5 
Service Type: 0 
  Precedence: 0 
  Delay: 0 
  Throughput: 0 
  Reliability: 0 
 
Total Length: 271 
Identification: 4e25 
Flags & Fragment Offset: 0 
Flags: 0 
  Reserved: 0 
  Do Not Fragment: 0 
  Set Fragment: 0 
Fragment Offset: 0 
TTL: 128 
Protocol: 17 
CRC: 40191 
 
Option Previous: 5420543 
Option Code: 5 
  Copy: 0 
  Class: 0 
  Number: 5 
 
UDP HEADER 
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Source Port: 1346 
Destination Port: 1347 
Message Length: 64256 
Checksum: 14576 
 
 
The following is another IP packet extracted from the detailed log file. This packet is 
using the TCP protocol for transmission. The IP addresses have been altered for 
confidentiality reasons. 
 
IP HEADER:  
01:41:44,766360 len:62 XXX.XXX.34.25:80 -> XXX.XXX.36.82:3294  
Version: 4 
Internet Header Length: 5 
Service Type: 0 
  Precedence: 0 
  Delay: 0 
  Throughput: 0 
  Reliability: 0 
 
Total Length: 48 
Identification: 4fa3 
Flags & Fragment Offset: 0 
Flags: 0 
  Reserved: 0 
  Do Not Fragment: 0 
  Set Fragment: 0 
Fragment Offset: 0 
TTL: 127 
Protocol: 6 
CRC: 40455 
 
Option Previous: 500cde 
Option Code: 0 
  Copy: 0 
  Class: 0 
  Number: 0 
 
TCP HEADER:  
Source Port: 80 
Destination Port: 3294 
Sequence Number: 5e9fc3b5 
Header length: 7 
Reserved: 0 
Code bits: 18 
  URGENT: 0 
  ACKNOWLEDGE: 1 
  PUSH: 0 
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  RESET: 0 
  SYNCHRONISATION: 1 
  FINISH: 0 
 
INFORMATION: TCP SESSION ESTABLISHING FROM 131.217.34.25:80 
TO 131.217.36.82:3294  
